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1/ SiasLlar s^Maries caa be îovsâ is Um (1975) f^aak (19?6)0 Ba.s©d 
oa the then available material^ Salassa (1971 ) provides a 
gtsvey of Korea's d@r@lopE2Hb tteoagh, tfe© 
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evaluate resource allocation and/®5 to quantify its detsra&mafca in tto 
Koreaa context is also ceasidaredo The paper coae3sd®s •Kith. a 
disctsssisa of the relevance of Sarea's sspapie&o® t© policy ssMag is 
other developing corasteies® 
y 
1 « Historical Overview 
Eao Republic of Koreâ  referred t© as fe®a (m& 
toe sisply as Korea)s ms created at the of W@KM Ite I I fey tfe© 
partition of the Korean pmdasnl&s tMoh End bag® fcgr Jepases® 
siaee the early 190Qs„ Tfeder Jspsa^s ©®l9®lsl asM^tamtiea^ ©pdetfiLtw® 
had fe®@s& iafcessiTOly d@mispsd is. Ssa&fesra MIS' ®f t&@. pesiasala-1@ 
pmafifc© everts of foodstuffs to la twa, iM®steial 
hM b@m s^ress^l istiX gtwtly fesf«® ¥@?M ¥ts? I I ia epfe g'sssTf© 
the teeaa ms'kst fop Jagisa8® Baasfaetwed ©Eporfes© A @&aag© i s ©@2®ai&l 
ee«aric policy si easing item moMlis&iie® ssabgeq&essi war led 
to the establishment of a small 'l^d^a" sasofaeteiss sfsetea? t@ gugspay 
'war mtsrial as wsll as local diseasd f « Hjg&tfc ®@mm<̂  §peds0 
Sconoade activity is the S@ath was desiaated •Esfeil s^ppesteafreSy 
1955 hy adjustaisats first t© parfcitioa and thm to Ik® digXoeat&e®® • 
caused by the Serosa War® Sms th®'Est?e®a ©©©aa^r's ¿M 1955 
was saeh the saas as it had foeea Isffc at of fch® Japaasa® eeespatioa 
aad s t i l l reflected the effects of ¿fepa&es© ©sXoaifil ©comaxic poUeies® 
U A detailed accorasfc is give» la easd Westgbal (1975)» 
"" ttaptsrs 2 through $ aal 11« 
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ifeffiofaet-Brdag aeemmted far ©aXy ©ight pspcmt of G$pa wMla mm*!^ 
iiB percent wigimtsd in th© primary sestets (s®© T&feX<& 1 b©X«)0 lis® 
t© tSse disruption md afteraatk @£ the Wtspp ts@p© tefe 
1 ol), pspeesfc e£ G1SV %M2® ffiarasfaet^ed ©spsg-fcs •&m>® -©irfctsally silo 
Korea's isdasiriel ste&tagr dtapissg tlx© last Ml f <s£ 19J>0s 
was predcssma&tXy 003 of import stabstitsfcioso I@s?g© se®2® 
of won (the domestic cweag- ) at th© legal ©xehasg® rat® by tfe® 5P@sid@at 
TO aalitssy ©st&blislwsnt pe>o?id©d a s&jcr satiTOtisa t© sadateisi m 
legal r>atea feea -̂ Mch a c ^ l ® stogst®1® ef E^ltipl® <g®s&s®g® 
rates evolved to ^©solf© bala&e® of ps^safc® gtrdblosso -2a 
addition M^i tarif fs î aesect ©a hmiszg ¿«sstieaH^ 
sMI ips j mastXj famafeed pFoctee&Sj,- aa& th® is^aasiag^ :?<s3Ll@i 
wg>cr& qa&sfcitativ© Smp t̂ p®str»isfcic@s A . S A S additi«saX E S S S S K 1 ® %© <§C?s<sfe 
th© pceep'essiTe dOT&Lmti«» ©f tfes troa« fete tfeos® p@liei©Sg t M i i <ssa 
balasio© appear to hav© favored ispert s^bstitmtiea ©res» e§sp<!®,tp0 BE3®®, 
coaplated the "©asy" ¡grna© of ¿tagwt' smbstitefcica fer aeasferabl© eoasmsg1 
goods s®Estlss ar©\Hid 1 ?S0o 
Stesttosless j th© st@rt of th© rapid aad swfealsad sf 
Korea's exports dates back t© th®, l&t© 1950s o fepsrts la 19s>6 -cssa?® ea!^ 
two tMrds of their real Talis© isa 19J?3j, th© last of th® feoaa Ifeo 
ffiiey begaa fp-cwiag rapidly is 19$1§ so that ia tli© foUesisg j b ^ 
real valia© of @sq?eris sta^assad that 1b 1953 W asas'l^ 16 -psremto • M 
current dollarss e^xsrts ia i960 were $32=8 MHlea» of tsfelds, p ® e » t 
(by SITC classification) ware sssofaetured products (s©® Table 3 iffl 
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Section 2 below)0 TSie principal iscaative to exports dor-lag this period 
caras from the multiple sxehasg® rate system, tinder which eaqpcrfe earsSags 
were concerted into fareiga exchange certificates that were 'traded at a 
prerairaa in a free markets, l&dest direet cash subsidies \mc® also ns@d 
for a short tiKee afc® variety of escport iae@Bti'F®g -disoisissd b®l«f ia 
Section 2 that trere operative mw saost of the 1960s md the f irst half 
of the 1970s were not yet in farce« Jh imt$ i t trns sot m M l 
when tariff escessptions oa i » c r tg of raw saatspial. for «s® ia prodwiag 
exports were first granted ,̂ that tey @l«aats of th® Istsa? s-jst@K bags» 
to be ia|ste©at®de 
The first five yaare of t&© 1960a was a period ©f 
politicals sad ecoaoadc iastabiHtj dwisg t3M.eh iter© "mm a mmb<w of 
attempts at poUcy refer® sad ec©aoM.c Sifeamlisatiea«. TJjpoa teMsg 
control ia 1961® the military gmm?wamt £sasd±at©l$? ©oasp2atsd t&D.task 
of uMi^isg the exchange rate that had begim 'Bsdtsr the- civilian, authorities 
who had replaced Siagman, Rhea a f t® tto Staieat R@F®3axtim,ia 1̂ 60® a® 
transition to the unitary esschaage rat© did act appreciably affect isepert. 
incentives s siaee the rat© established 3a 1961 ma sam^hMl tew than 
the pjpe-existijsg &©© ffiartet rat® ©a asspori ©e^aiags 0 ' ©sport «sr®!, la^jwesc, 
began to benefit tram aa increased range ©f iac@ati.TOSs, ©ss^ticn 
fee® indirect taxes both oa xaajar Ispats asd ea seqiert 8eJ.ess credit • 
subsidies •$hich progressively iaereased both ia t&® t®ms sad srailabl© 
volisas of preferential loaasg, asd 1 cms> (fey 50 peresat) direst tax rates 
on î&GQme earned through, export activity o Asâr, ea ©aqperfc pseeSmw&œ® 
criterios. was for- the first tiss established as the basis fa? gpoatiag 
issperters ® Uceases 0 twa^, as a result @f & â®@Mm M ïïoSo ĝ asfe 
aid g Import ecmtr ois wer® gradually tightsssd ss&as @£ Meoasiag . 
through seaä^amaal trad« propasa (tídcfe Äs® âaclsded gaspert tsrg@fcfs)s 
variable tariffs s and selective Isfort p»©feibitio@s 0 
l&e über alitati©® ptólosepfejf that had osargsd trat Tbs®®' 
thwartsd derisg the early sásties took firn hold after the eloetioa ©f a 
aoadaal civilisa gwrermmt mt\m> (Sxwsg Sss ?@?k ia 1 ( B ? © § M e i & 
P&rk still resalas in powsr,) ®J3®t®@a aisfcy-fs®? asad »s> tärae 
j®m1 a of »gor and sueeessML poïi'egr ia a ssbgp of tr©@sj tfê r 
als© saw the ©st&bHstagnfe ®£ sa @ff eefciir© gpstea <@f sfeerfc : 
y 
tara (isdieatlv®) plaaslago With r®gp©'6& t© sedmag® rat® & 
balase© ©f payssnts crisis ia 1963 haû 3M t© th® @S a 
mltipl® ©sshaags rat© sestiga«, Si® rat'® -mm 
rest«>ed ia 19oks> Asa the official t?©a=d@Har sssÄsag® rat® m s 
doubled far the second, tias äs tfe°©© A g © i t e w f f j tto . 
tioa was rased priaiarî r t© si^Hf^ the srtssp sad t® @f&@t 
d@®3stie ia£lat±©as rath®5 thaa t© iaer@as® dspert ia©©sfeiT@So Sfâ m â A m j 
esoehaag© rata has since saáafeaiaMp ísifch' paitóle d®rol@stlí§sir t© 
adjust fer a highes? iaflatioa rate ia ítem tfess im its saje®? tradissi 
1/ Fea? a. esSEpráheasire descriptiva asid taaSysis ©f th® ©o^slit® m t ®f 
~ referas s see Gole and igaaa (19?1 ) aad B?©:-m (19?3)i fes? a d®®<gr£pti« 
aad ©riOmtioa of plansdag ia feea^, se© Mtñmm (1^9) smâ W®s%fea¡l 
aad M®lmaa ( 1 9 7 2 ) respectively 
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partners® 
Other reforms dmimg this psriod iaeluded an increase ia cossr-
cial bank deposit and leading ratesa -which increased the latter S?©s 16 
t© 26 parceatj a price stabilisation program,, isMeh successfully levered 
th© rat© of inflation and2 a revision of the a<Meisti*a,tiaa a& direct 
taxes, which was required to maintain a reasonably higjti ratio ef tas 
collections to GMP« These reforms were iffipertaHfc ia ehMiaUtsig laer@aa©d 
private savings through farml-seeter fiaastcial iMtit^bioas anS ia 
generating higher savins • 
Iffiporfc cosctrols were gp?$fi»&lJy ?©la28sd foUogdag th® 1 ŜU 
devalaatic© as the raasbsr of ifcesas ©Sigible f<®> raarestristssl isgxart' 
increased» However 9 it was not tsstH 1967 that a M j s r @t®p wm iaksa 
in liberalising iaport restriction threagh a ssdltch £tm th® s@-e®X3M 
"positive" list syat®% rate which those e<e®editie3 l isted i a the 
trade p^c^am say b© imported* t® th® »Begstiv©«« l ist gygftê  rad® iMeh 
all coa§s>diti©s not listed msj assfcOffisMeaHy b@ .•Klthogt ^esfeie» 
tion. Ia ttir% th© tariff structure that had «"igiaaJJ^ bam sr@&t@d in 
19k9 remained uachaagad. rarbil 1 except fee» a M » rmlslm £& 
to protect recently esasrged dessestis isdmstri®®*. Bat th® tari f f rsferm 
Taadertaksa. ia 1961 ulti®at©3j led to vary £'m &suag@se 
To sTwasrises industrial iacea&iv© policies m&±X 1966 
wore those typically associated sith an is^art gabatitstic® ragisip 
though sqjoctsrs1 receipts of foreign exchange were ®oM in a free-market* 
Oror the aecst five years, a asod©st3y onxtward-lcoiciag set of iae@ffifciv® 
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policies was adopted aletog mth a package ©f ®Dn®tary=>fise&l 
desigasd to reduce inflation and increase doisstic swiagae ^ 
expo?ters were ©geratiag -eMor a &e® trad® r©^®s Tsith a r@®3istiea2aj 
valued exchaage rate (see Ssctioa 2) whils isspaet ©enrols TOT® Readily 
"beisg looseaed® On the other has.dP protest!«® f«? th© d«s>sti© sustefc 
was protected by tari f fs ®ad the r<§®siaiag ©«fcreisj, Ails a ©sail 
l ist of import sT&bstittxfciag industries received m ^ of th® @®ss i®s<sa» 
tives pasted to exporters 0 With tab Ma®? <6see@ptiioe§s iactestsdal 
iaeeative policies have resialesd tBsehaaged sia©@ 1 
there appears to have beea a eosfciro&l tr<s@d t w d Jifesealisigg isp®rt 
eesxfcrols <, 
Xfeder the î set-as of jjapsrfo siabs tit&tiea fe? essays®®1 g©eds2 
real value added ia saawfaetis'lsg rose at aa ssrasel ©e§pp@asd rat© @f 10o3 
pereeob dwisg the Xattgr half off th© M i l s (s©® Tabl© 1 a ® a . 
remit ®f political aad ©eoaossi© testability fe©tw®esa 1$6Q ©ad tbs 
groe-ith of saEMfact^piag valu® added was loss th®a ?o0 pgrcsafc ia festh 
sad 196ks thaegh rates of gresto than 13«0 pss?@©sb -me® mMmr®d M 
1962 sad 1963 lasBsdiataly aft®- the first ottes^t at policy mt^sm, . Ba 
the decade follcslag 1965P th© mEfflfaetis?iB!g seet®? hm at m £®®aal 
eos^ooad rate of 19o9 p®rceat„ la th® gectsfch rat® of r@ol essgerfc®' 
since 1957 has beea 2?Q1 psreeat pscr a m w o Orsr th© past 18 ysargg th© 
share of ccwodities ia total experts has rises Q?sa roughly $0 p<gr©@at 
to Bare thaa 90 percent^ t-jhil© ®aasfae&®a®g hav® ia®g»©&s©d 
teap^ce&t of total, coamodity experts to slightly isar® thaa 80 ps^css&o 
- Íf8 -
• Rapid growth o f Korean e x p e r t s c l e a r l y p?@~d&t®s th© s w e o s s t s U y 
i38plwm&®& -policy r e f s r a s of t h e Kid - s i x t i e s o B a t tbls is not i b o o b * 
sisteasb w i t h th© g r o w t h o f e x p o r t s ts&Tiag been s t i x s l & t e d foy @sg><ss?t 
i n c e n t i v e s , s i n c e t h e r e a l s f f e s t i v e osstiaag©. ^at© f a ? s ^ c r t ® mm p®?h&ps 
h i # @ r i n th© l a t e 1950s t h a n i t h a s b e e n a ± & m (s®@ Tabl© 2 i a S@©t±®a 2 
b e l o w ) « F a r t h e m e r © , , ©sep<orts i n i t i a l l y grew from a a <sEfertg®©1y « 0 3 . feas©s 
w M l s t h e i r g r o w t h a c c e l e r a t e d a f t e r th© 19&k<S rsforss. r ©feres 
ar© t h u s s o s t p r o p e r l y c r e d i t e d w i t h hatiag laid th® f e r a d & t i o a s f c r • 
c o a t i s u a d r a p i d e x p e r t g r o w t h oac© a l a r g e r bag© hud be®® sst&felishsd® 
Xhsy were th© c o n c e p t anfc of th© geftrsmaMit's d,©Qisi@a to adept a sfes?at©gy 
o f A l p o r t e x p a n s i o n when f a r t h e r e p p « t i s a » t i @ s for isg>erfe g A g t l t ^ f e i e a 
w&re e s l y t o b e f o r a d i n ia^rsswiii&t® and ( t o a b l ® gosds s i t e ® t®«lmeiltegLeal 
eemcasLes o f seal© and th© M a i t e d d o n a t i o » s k e t £m th® ©affly 1960s 
p r e c l u d e d e s t a b l i s h i n g e f f i e i a a t sis© plasrtee tti® d s e i s i o n wae f i m S y 
reached, however^ aaly a f t e r a p e r i o d o f issevesa i & t e t r i s l grouch« 
As t o o t h e r i a d i e a t c r s o f feoa's d s r o l o p r a a t p a r f c r a a r i e e j r e a l 
pea? c a p i t a l a c « © i n c r e a s e d a t an geimaX eassporad r a t ® of 2 C 2 p-wemfc 
2 / 
before 1965 and 8 . 2 p e r c e n t thsre&ffesr® B ® » s t i e roe® 
1 , 6 p a r c e n t o f GHP i n 1960 t o a peak o f 2 2 . 9 psreesfe i a 19?3s iff irostusgt 
a l s o i n c r e a s e d q u i c k l y ^ s t a r t i n g a t 1 0 <,9 p&remxb o f 6 ® i a 1?60 a ^ y@aelii®g 
an a n - tiase h i g h ©f .31 »U p e r e e a t i n 197k (based <m © ^ r e a t pa?ic® f±g®»©s)® 
1 / A c c o r d i n g t o t h e 1975 World Bank A t l a s , fc©a!s p e r e@pit& iaee®§ i a 
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In iterâ  the share of «sports in real G-HP rose by ©res» ten times beteam 
1960 and 1975«. All of this amounts to an isp?@gsive grovth perfoa?mne© 
over most of the past two decades . Hie feeaa ©corneâ  has also performed 
well with respect to esployssat and inceras distribution^, as "Kill be 
documented in following sections. 
2o A Closer Look at Export Incentives and VwSmmxm® 
As was observed in the previoss se<stion9 an incentive syatmi 
that generally favored esports mm? iâ sarfc s'ahstituti©» ia th© saaufaetwicg 
sectors was not firmly entr©neh©d until srerod » tbssgh ©Xpert @r@ 
bemfittgd from a fre© w t e t ©Eehange rat© ia the last iaalf ®f th® 1950s 
while various export inc©Htiv©s ease into being ia th® mrly 1960@o It 
is virtually ispossibls to estimate .quantitatively th® ia^mct tfe® 
various incentive policy changes that took place fe®tw@@n 1?60 m d 19&$° 
'JMs is partly due to the tantesrai effect of insert eestaals m t&® cost 
of eopcrt production^ ©specially in mamfact wing s prise6 to th© ip'assbiag 
of free access by esqpcrters to inserted r m mteri&ls 0 & twm.9 î psrfc • 
controls ¡aake it ¿¿̂ possible to deteraia® th© da^re® of protect!« afforded 
production for domestic sale from, tariff information ®X©a®<> tefi^ it.is 
not th© absolute Isvel of ©scpcrt irosafciva© that ««»ceres ims tafe rathsr 
their relative level vis-a-vis the incentives panted to domestic saleso 
BstaHed ecs^arisoas of .dcwastic and wrld market prices have h®m sad® 
only foe 19685 a discussion of th© results ©f this srsrsy is postponed 
to Section h below® 
- 11 -
Here it is seeessary to rely ̂ »oa estimta© of the ®££®®feiv® 
exchaag© rate for experts to gaia s ems iœoressioa. ©f the tr®®d.@?-®r tfcg v 
in escort incentives ® Table 2 presets thes® eaiäÄtasj, Ä Ä toßlnä® 
the value (per-dollar of experts} of those iaesafcives f«3 A l A qeasteitatlv® 
iaformatio® is available o Fœ eor^srises^ .als© sheas is the tabla is 
the effective exchange rate for issp̂ ftsj, th© aeÄ&al vale© ©f tisieh ©fa&ls 
the official exchaage rat© plus average emsto» dmties &&d tariff @qsiva<= 
lextfcs (e®g»g preala paid to purchase fep©ig& ©aashasg© ©<erfci£i©sfe®a &-ea 
©snorters) paid per dollar of isspcrtso Xfc sh@sM fe® folly wdtrgtoodg 
hessenrer̂  that the effective ©gsehaag© rat® fœ> inserts -is a virfemiïïy 
œaaxsdagiess iadicatcr ©f pretectiosa feem ees^atisg inerte ûm> t® tà® 
presmee of isgjert coatrols throuĝ stsb tba p@ri©d w œ r i ia th©-.ta3blSo 
Hie »st is^srbast. incest ives t© sEpert®5© fegr 19&$ 
mrestricrbed access to. and tariff ©sasptîoas m. tepœ^tûd raw atrial® 
aad capital goods | gmsrous .wastage a ü ^ m e ® ia â§fe®iM^ dtefcy m â 
indirect tax free raw œateri&l isäpcrtss rafcieh p«rsaLited ,th® m ® ®f f,®® 
of these inperbs to prod&ce fer s'&L® » th©. desastie sarleafèf œssçtim 
fresa pa^œsBi of- indirect taxes both œ major- vm ffi&tsrial Ssp&tg aad ®a-
e&pcrfc sales; a $0 percent reduction in direct t®s®s ©a i a c » @®re©d 
e&pcrtixsgs access tp subsidised shert ssad asdira tg^a .credit t© fiasse© 
wsrkiag capital and..fixed isvestBsasfc respectively! gadj, rat® r@d&eti<sg§ 
oa several overhead iapats iactodiag alâctr&sity aad railread 
tàxLch were intended at least ia part to cesspessata for.p®y»nfe of iadir@et 
- Íf12 -
taxes included in the nctraal charges fes* these ii^ats® Infcrffi&tion is 
not available regarding the value of the excess of the wastage allowance 
over actual wastage in production fa8 ©apart 8 Efesspt far this s«bsie|fs, 
the difference between the ñaaáml effective exchange rat© for e^wts 
versus domestic sales ar̂ . the official «scchange rate, both of which are 
shewn in Table 2, is equal to the total value of the incentives listed 
per dollar of ceramodity espcrts» 3he difference also iaeMes the 
premium on espcrt earnings under themltipl© exchange rat© system 
it was operative. However,' it excludes th©-value of the 
link system which entitled easporters to import cert&ia "pejaaXsp'' itess . <. 
ráiicfa. were not otherwise approved for Imortc - OMs system m @ 
extensively as a means of subsidising ©sports áwLng the 1st® and 
fárst half of the 1960s» lb "baft sdne©'t>©©8 us@d oo^'inbenti&tonbly on 
a more or less ad hoc basis to offset espertara tascar spy l@ás©g dm© to 
market fluctuations or entry into mm wtets^ and by now i t hm 
been coapletely abandoned. 
SCSES of the incentives to espartes listed "SBCRR© are m*b gssoine 
subsidies • Except where there is cw^-rebafeiag, the eaŝ sptios of 
sales from indirect tax©s on the SOTS products s®M doMstie&Uy asrely 
establishes tax neutrality under the destination principia that exacts 
©sports frost indirect taxes while such taxes are iaposed on imports. 3is 
turns táiils exertion ffrcsa tariffs on imported isgmts aiad' Spam, indirect 
taxes on major iî rats regardless of source favors «ss^wts vis-a^vis 
production for dc&sstic sal©# this »©asure @&2y relieves ©^sartors fee® a. 
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bürden that x-rmM put them ia a diggd̂ rant®g@©es g@s£tioa as em^mmä t© 
easpesets fr osa otte eombri©®® Sì® ©££®et of pss?®dttiag .isepertea t® 
tare tm@ mcess to iapists «falls r®stri©tiag &s©m@ ia tfe@ ©as@ 
of predtaetica fer the.d«®sti© mästet is tim asm> & 
fis^-ids world sartet 'ppicM, the ®f£<®@t of ttes® is 
srtaply to ¡robjeet expcrters to a fifa© traés spart 
i^uts (mostly aoBifce,adab3®8)5 pri<s©@ iasM© äM&^et tassa® @eä 
tariffa isfeied at all stages e£ protection* pffi?A®s© tfeste 
ispats and s©H thsir ©atpx&s at m r M pries®o teaiàa® gÄsMäs® 
tbos i»lsd©d eaa th® s®3b • of ioqpozt ?©e©iptB msiss? tfe© ssätipl® 
esehssg® rat® systs®s msrtags eHossaaeas to iEfegat t&gy issg© Sa 
of actus! mstaga^ .-direct t ® M Ä M j <®©dit p^fis»®®©^ psslaipg 
part of ths rat© redoetioa ©a wwhsad ispsfeŝ  o M prefits to tä® 
oqMrb-lspart Hak syst@®o V&th th® ssasifticss asted afeSÄfüp tte ä£ffsr®«s 
hatmm th® abseist© ncsdaaX «£féet±ro escihàass mt® tba efifiedsl 
rate (see Table'2) sqimXs the s ® <*? tim®. sÄsidipar d@Hsr 
of espcerbs«, 
The absolate ztmämX ©ffectiv® sssehâ g® rat® fer esperte 
iadicates the averag© msEb®0 of T-roa ia pri@®s reesiTOd p m d©Har 
of ©shorts j also ia cwreat ppicesu AastzKLag ttet tbe vri. em of a 
• ccasfcsy's expcrts manre is parallel mtfc fareigps prie© ®w«safc% salti» 
plgriog the ncatìaal effectiY© ©schasg© rate ìsy ©a iste of p?ic@s 4a 
orerseas siarkets yields th© ®Ä<sr of woa ia ©®r®afc priees reetóftó psr 
dollar of sstpertŝ  th© latter in ccastaafc pries®o Raas, äe£3&täsg 
T lft = 
[TAKLBn 2 
Exchange Rates foriExports and Imports 
Effective Exchange Bates 
" For Inports 
Nominal Purchasing Purchasing 
Official Versus Power ftmer 
Exchange Domestic Parity Parity 
Rate Sales Absolut« Adjusted Morainal Adjusted 
L958 50.0 n.a. . 115.2 280.6 6U.0 155.9 
1959 50.0 136.0 325.6 82.8 198.2 
i960 62.5 s»a. 1V7.6 319.6 100.2 216.9 
1961 127.5 n<>a. 150,6 289.1 1U7.0 282.2 
1962 130.0 151.5 Uil.2 21*6.0 1U6.H 255 a 
1963 130.0 189 <k 176.7 257.3 .U16.I 215.7 
L96U 21U.3 281. U 263.0 285.0 21*7 oO 267.6 
1965 26$ ok 30k,6 273.0 273.0 293.1 293.1 
1966 271.3 322.9 281.6 266.0 296. u 280.0 
1967 270.7 333^1 285 .U 256.3 296.2 .266.0 
1968 276.6 35^ »3 291.8 2I46.I 302.5 255.1 
1969 288.2 363.3 302.9 2U6.5 312,7 25U.5 
1970 310 0 7 391 320.0' 253.6 336.1* 260.1 
1971 3^7.7 U50.7 365.8 263.5 369.5 266.2 
1972 391.8 U82.7 t02.3 261.0 ia5»2 -269.3 
1973 398.3 U89.9 U05.7 281.0 I417.7 2B9.li 
197U U07.0 51S.2 U15.6 253.8 l»2U.O 259.0 ' 
Sources iTiures for 1958 through 1970 taken from Franks 11% and Vfestphal 
[1975]9 Tables 5-8 and 5=9» Figures for 1971 through 197U taken from 
an unpublished study.-by Kwang Smk liay Korea Development Institute, Seoul. 
Notess Figures are annual averages® 
Conceptuallys the absolute nominal effective exchange rate for exports 
does not include the average (per dollar of exports) value of indirect 
tax and customs duty exemptionss whereas the nosinal effective exchange 
rate versus domestic sales does include it. The data required to calcu-
late this .average value are not available prior to 1962. , ¡furthermore, 
separate estimates of the average value ©f direct and indirect internal 
tax exertions are available only for 1968 tte©agh-lf7U, SQ that the 
absolute nominal effective exchange rate for exports shown.here excludes 
(for all..years) the average value of direct tax exemptions aa well. 
Direct tax reductions on income earned from export' activity were 
granted starting in 1962 and were abolished in 1973- Hie average value 
of this subsidy beWeen 1968 and 1973 is shown below8 
m m m m m 
The purchasing power parity adjusted effective exchange rate is the 
nominal (in the case of exports, absolute) effective exchange rate Multiplied 
by the ratio of the foreign price level to the domestic price level. It is 
thus a "real" exchange rate. (The base year is 1965.) The effective 
eseetoagie rate (bcth s«isal and real) fear Â xggtg; is m mpmj. 
tariffs and tariff equivalents, mt on their lagsl vainee", fW® i&icij. 
there were widespread exertions aiad reductions • 
- -
figuro so obtaiasd fey an irdes of dosasti© prices gives the bb I®' of 
won in constant prices received per dollar of ©sportss also 1® ©»gtgfflt 
prices Q The resulting (absolve) piardaasisg-power-pariiy adj«steds <sr 
reale, effective exchange rate for experts is shosra. is the fifth c o l . 
of Table 2C 
The average level of the real effective tagsehasg® rata fcr 
experts between 19Ó1 a&d 191k m s 262 o? wUk the asda?@» vales' 
2h£*0 (in 1962) and 289,1 (ia 1961)0 Orar this pariod, the raag® U thm 
only l6oh percent of the av@rag@s !2s© rata was tesgt fte® «sredisg too 
neatly between devaluations by temporary iaer©as©s ia stibsi^r ratf®0 
(By gLrisg ammal averages of the official «gseehang® rat®, T&bl® 2 
it appear that d&rs^wsMom ©ccasred ara?®£p0qe®nt3y thaa they ia fa©t dido) 
Si twa3 relative to its average orsr th® preeodlog ilv® » sis grafs?»* th© 
real effective «change rate for mpm>ta iasre&sed afp?@eÌ8bly 5a th© 
lattea0 half of "1972 and early 19?3a by » d i «ore th®a is app@r«t £j?es 
the aaamal averages » Ia r©spaas© to this as well m o t te s lug® t̂ gssitcs^ 
indications that esparb isceativeg «re perhaps ̂ ©Idiag @kc©88±TO profits s 
the gmet'msni abolished a assizer of iaeessfciv® ®aasr®psso Ext® «abortirai 
now no leager benefit fee® lower direct tast rates er autsas&i© teiff 
©XOTptioas on Smarted co i ta l goods, «bile « tag© aUcwamses tar® 
declined as have credit subsidies o Exj>@=ts nonetheless coaftiras' to @ e w 
rapidly3 though there was a te^erary drop ia their" rat© ®s a 
result of world Biarfeet conditions i a 197ko 
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The real effective exchange rate for escort® shown in Table 2 
is of course only a vary crude indicator« I t would increase the precision 
of the estimates as an indicates* of prof i tabi l i ty if the nomiml aKcfeaHg® 
rate were aailtiplied by an index of eap«rt «nit values or iESp&pfo jsricss 
abroad rather than by t>r> index of the general price level ateoada Eqaally, 
the overall domestic -wholesale price index should b© y®pXac@d by an iffldea; 
of wholesale prices weighted by assort VOIUBBBS i f &mi s omaemn is with 
profitability relative to doasstic sales or, by sa ifidsss of prodsstipa 
costs if one's interest i s i a the absolute (rat&sr than, rstLativ©) profita-
bility of everts« likewise, the precision o£ t t e ©stiaates as an 
indicator of conpetitiveaess weald be by isaing iradic®8 pf 
domestic and foreign production costs ia place ©f price Indices ® Ito^ab» 
llshed refinements of the estimates in the ."Latter direction by M s BaXassa 
coafirm that the competitiveness of Korea's esperbs in 19Ik m & 1975 tjas 
sli^atly greater than in the .late 1960s, "sMl© it had achieved m ©Etesss 
level between 19?1 and 1973® 
Continued rapid growth of mqparts has been associated with a 
relatively high and stable real effective exchange rate2 but efforts to 
"prove" the relationship statistically have not yielded notably robust 
conclusionss owing largely (and soaawhat paradoxically) to the relative 
stability of the exchange rate. Nonetheless, based on regressions of 
real experts against the real effective exchange rate versus de®Bftle 
sale, Frank, Kim, and Westphal (1975» PP® 85-86) cs®e3®d@ that n B p s the 
responsiveness of exports changed sharply after 19&3 ° °« Befcre 19&3* 
- 1 ? -
sensitivity to exchange rate policy was laekijag because -ŵ ® 
insignificant and because the system of mltipl© exchange rates®<ms 
very inefficiento" It appears that two othsr factors also at w<es?k 
aakiag exports move kt^ily responsive to the real effective sse&aag® 
rate after 1963: i t ww probably wb until 1963 er shortly th@? ©after 
that the gaveraaent's intention to gst&Mlia® eaportsrs» profits at 
relatively high rates was clearly pereeivsdj aidp th® geraral eapaeity . . 
of th© econoagr to producê  ^Mcfe did set begin' sanding rapidly until 
after 1963., may have been an iâ ertaasfc factor« 
As to th® error al l ®£i®eb±vfmm@ of IS»3®©® ssefcaag© rafe© asd 
iacmstive policies g Sfcaakg « 3 W@grfci&al Oaaffc^e ® oM 
develop and estiaata ® ©qeaties md&L to dewiagtrat®" t&i© 
M-sterlc&l valrnes of th© official <sseiMfflg@ ratss tariffs» m& subsidiesa 
taken together 3 marly restd&ed i s acMsslag the Egsdssm growth 
rate0 Ccabis&Bg subsidies ©a ®§̂ >©rts frith tariffs on t&a 
optimal off icial exchange rat® was f«md to b® abosfc ©«pal to th® &i@t«ri©gl 
ratea thouga to yield th© sasdsal p 3 ©^ rat©- tariff eol3®eti«s 
have been soffist&at high«5 than th<§y ae&mUy nhida toy® 
gelded higher gm&mmsA. saviagss isrostsseakg asd ttas pmfe&o led® 
•the Sgppofcfesfcical iraal growth re^ts© start Jag ia i$603 real Igy 1970 
would have been rooghly seven percent Mg&sr thaa i t aetmMy ts&so 
Esaort P^farzaaace 
In response to stable and adequate iaceatives^ sxperta hm® act 
only grown rapid!ys they hare also bee«© acre diversified0 3Ma ®sy b® 
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seen in Table 3, while the following discussion is based on somewhat 
more detailed statistics. The most inpartant items in Korea's experts 
in 1$60 were primary products, including (in order of their importance) 
metallic ares, rice, crude animal and vegetable materials, fish, and 
dried seaweed® Woven cotton fabrics were mere than half of exported 
manufactures, which in turn accounted for less than 13 percent of total 
commodity exports. The share of manufactures g^ew rapidly after 1960, 
reaching slî itly more than £¡0 percent by 1965» Clothing, plywood, woven 
cotton fabrics, and plates and sheets of iron and steel each accounted 
far mare than five percent, of comeodity ex^ts in that year ® By 1970* 
clothing had grown to mace than a quarter of Korea's exports .of goods, 
plywood and textile fabrics were each ®sr© the®, ten percent, sad electronics 
were approaching five percent. In turn, the ability of Korean estrepr©-
nera?s to respond aggressively to werld aarkot was shown in the 
rapid rise of wigs and human hair experts fipcaa ail in 19$0 to about 12 per-
cent of coBHEOdity exports in 1970. Haas© experts later declined in 
value, falling to one and a half percent of experts in 1975, as the spot-
light of fashion turned away from wigs and false eyelashes« 
Bie composition of Korea's exports in 1975 was well diversified 
by comparison with other developing economies® Exports exceeded one 
hundred million U.S. dollars for each of the following items in that year 
(listed in order of iaportance): woven textile fabrics (of which cotton 
fabrics were less than ten percent),, electrical machinery, and appliances 
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sheets of iron and steel, vane er sheets and plywood, footwear, t r a n s p c r t 
equipaant, clothing, manufactures of metal, and »©Metallic miasral 
msaiufactures. Together, exports of priisary products i n c l u d e d i s SITG 
categories 0 through 3, which had represented n>9 than 80 per cast of 
commodity experts in 1960, totaled $925 m ü l i a a * , which was l e s s t h a n th® 
combined exports of woven testile fabrics p l u s e l e c t r i c a l i m e h i a s r y 
appliances b y over $1£0 MHion« Ispcrts o f r i e e , mere t h a n tea per-east 
of t h e total in 1960, wer© a i l aft®- 1967« 
As is shown i n Table U, Eer©a!g ©sports classified b y d e s t i n a t i o n 
also became less concentrated as xsasafaeiw©! e v e r t s grew« Jspsa8s 
share fell from nearly two t h i r d s i a i960 to U t t l ® less tbm, mm fourth 
In 1975, while the share of the ttoited Skates rose Area nearly seven 
psreant in 1960 to almost ©a® h a l f i a 1970 b@fer© falling t o roughly 
30 percent in 1975» Ih turn, Korea's exports to Ear ope and the rest of 
i&e wer Id increased mac© than proportionately s with these t o the Ä d d l e 
East rising particularly fast a£t®r 19?3® 
2Ms is an appropriate poiat t o dispal s m m s l cocao© 
sions regarding the sources of Karo&'s esspsrt pt̂ fasmssie©® M l @f tfees© 
i ^ M a Korea's success i n tsraa of its special r@Xail©figMp t@ to© I M t e d 
States and Japan. The data i n Tab!® h @hm that th® sher© of Seres'® 
esparto to countries other than the I M t e d States and J&pa®, iasr®ased 
from 30,0 to liU.2 percent between i960 and 1975« which i s not consistent 
with this applanation. In turn, an analysis by Cole (1975), deeonstrates 
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that tarn * s share la IMted States8 imparts m e less thsa that of W w s 
and Haag Itog throu^mat the period covered (1$62«.?2)0 . la 19625 fees«© 
share ia the ItaLtsd States' issport Market m s QeOS percent «hü© Taimm 
and Hong Kong had shapes of 0o3 and 1 o0 pareant respectively. Qr 
Korea's share had risen to 1 «3 percent ©ad ttaa® of M w i and Mmg tag . 
to 2,3 percent each® With respeet to Japs®«3 Sjjperfeŝ  share 
g@a«rs02y fell shark of Taiwan's bat @Ke@©ded H«g taag'ss ttes® 
shares in Jean's ispcrts in 1972 (1962) «ere 1.8 (0*5)? U 8 (1o1)5 m ä 
0o5 (0.3) percent respectively0 It It&si t© ths tb&t H<ng tag 
fe&s no special relationship mth «Liter the tfedtad Stetes 0? Apes, ties® 
co^arisoss do net suggest tfeat te®a5s imparts w@r® partieigairlj fwgred 
by its ties with these eoratries® d©s tafsvsPj, off®1 TOef®! 
perspectiv© on jast hew guce@ssfaX feeaa ŝ pKsrfcsrs hav© hsm at peaa&ra-! 
ting foreiga Markets« 
la faets with "bat as® ssespti®^ fe>@aa mparts har© r@@®iv<Ba 
special preferences tmavailsble t© othsr disrolepiag ©aratey @sp«:t€®as 
tram, either the IMted States or J&pano ®5£©spfci« ©©earrsfi 
the Vi@taa© Wars when Korean espertsrs wng>® ©?®st®il spss&al p?<s£@r<sa©<® ia 
ssäütsry proe^essst* H«®rer§ es^eris vM®s> sä2±t®y pfoswiBSiBt 
not TOS&il 196? and avsraged «3y 3 oh pareosfe @f tofeal ®sp@?tgi mm 
the seven yaars to 1973» Ä e e®fcriteti<s® t® Iteea'e sssssl 
1/ gg^erts ©a» in 1968 and was 60k psreenfco 
V B?anks Wms and Wesfcphal (1975)» FP<> .77-8 0 
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T&BÏM k 
Destination.of Commodity Exports 
1970 
United States 2.2 6.7 
Japan 20.8 63.1i 
Europe U.6 1U.1 
Other Asia 3.8 11.6 
Rest of World l.lf 
TOTAL 32.8 100.0 








X 2 ® 2 
23 o9 
100.0 
395.0 U7.3 1,536.3 30.2 
233.9 28.0 1,292.9 25 oU 
76.0 9.1 936.7 18.h 
81.8 9.8 760.0 Hu9 
Mé. - ¿ I 10.? 
835*2 100.0 5,081.0 100.0 
Sources Bank of Korea, Economic Statistics Xsarbook, various issues. 
Notes Values are in millions of current U.S. dollars. Totals may not Reconcile 
du© to round-off error. 
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Beyond the military proem* eiEssrt just discussed,, Ear@&!0 ssperts 
saay also have benefitted froes ecraercial relationships direct, 
foreign iwestjaeafcp subcontracting) fostered by its close tie® t® the 
United States and Japan, I am mnrare of aay studies «Meh psessit 
general conclusions to be readied regssrdiag this possibility 9 feat th© 
foUosiag points are relevant* 
• Host 3sg>crtant9 direct f@r@i|p. iiw®st»atfe has n@t fe@s© r®ep®sifel© 
y 
for a very large proportion of total £er@i|p capital inflows «> fe©a 
hasj, of courses, relied extensively m tes&ga ss^Ssgs t© fimm® £ 
ront | the ratio of iasporbe MOTS everts t© isrogtesrat av@r®g©$ 56 ok 
parceat-between 1955 and 1975» th® rati© t© CW ©v<srag@d 9®6 pgr©<s*gl>G 
Bsarfjag the 1950S and early 1960s., tasa'is ©«MJ?®^ trad® d©fi@ife w 
alsost ^ o B y financed by geaat aid frea tba Ife&ted latioaa ©sd tte' M t e i 
States o It t-ras not until the ®ld»si3Cti©s that £®r®i|p bcrnsaisg fesefiss ' 
V Legislation, controHiag asas^aat fw®ipa capital lafle©® was f irst 
~ passed ia 1960o defers®©®® s iadadisg a rath® standard gasls.§© 
of tax concessions for direct foreifp. imwteasrkp w@r© sSaslt©s.©@asly. 
established to stisaalat© th® ia f l e j @f feroiga capital aad 
tM3a lamts m equity iarestjasat and gr©f£t' r<§M,tt@ae®@ fey 
iavestffi's were coffipiately reswed in 1966 0 fh® ralativsly 3m 
v@lisj© of direct fereipt iss*©st®ss®ifc ia Kmm .dmdag th® 19&Q® is 
c«s®£y explalmd either by the «acartsdsfciss of its politieaX 
tioa ors ms?e plausibly s by pwposeM. administrative tsetie® tfeat 
w<sre (apparent3y) related ia th® ©arly 1970s 3 i t ma s@t dm t@ tia® 
lack of legislated isduoeasnts o 
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v ispertant, but oace started it asstsssd large proportions: However, 
most of the private capital inflow was ia the form of courasreial loam. 
Between 1966 and 1971, direct foreign investment averaged less than fessr 
percent of total foreign capital inflows. proportion increased to 
average nearly 20 percent over the next fear years s largely due to 
Japanese investment stimulated by rising wages and dmdrorasobal ccfflfcrols 
at heme. Cumulative direct foreign imostmrnt in Korea pri» to 1970 
was appreciably less than $100 n&Hian ia current prices j tbe ipflw 
from 1970 to 1975 was x&uch larger $ ia the neighborhood of $700 silOicn.» 
3ms, any substantial role played by direct foreign iEwestaaast ia presating 
y 
Korea's exports would have com® aft® 1970« 
jn fact, it was not uKbü 1970 that lsr®a established its first 
free trade zone explicitly designed to attract direct foreign partieipa« 
tion in exports. Up to B&d«1973,., total everts firo® fir®3 l©eat@d ia 
this aon© cumulated to only $20 MJUss,, bhmgk the total p l m m d smmsl 3/ ee^crt volume from these firms was $309 ffliUi«su thaa hs3£ of t&® 
1/ In 1966, official ©casts were rou^aly ©pal ia vols» to 2mm $ 
by 1970, the vol®» of latter ma asr® thaa fiv® tima® the siae of tfe© 
fctTEsrs, while less than half of tb» loan rivals weare &«n govemsasfc 
aad multilateral sefsrees. lest of t&e foreign'private leaas fleeing 
teto Korea have cane fipo® Japan, the TMtsd States, and Western Itespes 
aaay, bub by no rasans aU 5 hav® bees ! credits <s£ &m f«® er 
another. 
2/ Hie discission in this paragraph is based on ifcank, M.ms aM Western! 
~ (1975), Chapter 7 and various statistic©! jpfdblioatioas of th© Basic of 
Iterea and the Ecoaoaic ELsnniag Board. 
3/ Figures in 1973 dollars. See Shm (197$). 
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plamïsd esspcarfcs were to some from, electrical sacMasry sod appHaae® 
prcdue®rs5 aost of .whom were involved in offshore electronics asgeaMyo 
In twn5 data are available to indicate the estent of foreign* » s t l y 
Japanese followed by American* involvemnt in electronics export® as ©f 
1972 o At that time, wholly-owned foreign ftaas a&gounted far 31«, pgresat 
of total production and $h percent of esperta withia the iadoatxŷ  th@ 
1/ 
respective figures for joint ventwes were 20 and 18 peroea&o lEteetr«» 
ics thus appears to be on© indrastsy ia ifhieh f@>@ign parti eipatâ« feas 
been ia^ortaat in Korea's ©sport pspfasmasee . SiAlar data fer e t t e 
iadöstries are lacking^ bmt w isp?©ssi®a is that ©Isetroaies esperte 
rspresœt an atypical ia th® ®sfe®at of ̂  foreign e©S2aber®.ti@aa 
3h sroaarys i t appears msrasted t© coasted© -feat fesa! s 
remarkable achievement as an «assert®» ©f sssa^aefaapss is largtly to 
the efforts ©f its @Htr<ggr@süirs aad mig?- teagosM-eiai?* tessÄtei í&m Wm 
vmlqm cir constances t j isg Korea to its &Hi®So 
3 o Uba Hole of feade Eksgaagim to Indas trial im®lapaamfe 
The v®y low share ©f ssperfcs ia QW ©bs®r©d is 1 is 
atypical by international ccsjparisono 3Ms roggasts thst th® ©f 
Korea's œports can b© iatezpr@t@d saaply in t®r®s @f eatcMag^ t@ the 
isternatieaal "narffi0 " To see -Aether this is so r@<pâr®§ ©œpsriBg 
Isrea's economic stractwe with that of ether ©oo&tries o£ sâMlar sise 
and level of overall d®^©lop®sat 0 It is a©t v<sry msofsl t@ ^M®. 
y sa (1975) 
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directly, however, far there are. very few countries ia the world that 
are siadlar to Korea in these respects® A mere useful, albeit iadireert, 
comparison can be made using the results of cross-country regression 
analysis aimed at determining the average, or "nam," economic structure 
at different levels of development and according to country size." 
Table 5 compares structural nones applicable to toe®, for 1955 , 
and 1972 with the historically observed structural share®., . ( M M 
sevea&y-two is used rather than a later year to avoid the psssSM© . 
distorting effects of the world boo® ia 1973 and tfca subs@cp®afc aftermath 
of the increase in oil prices«) • Two sets of nana estimates ere give®» 
idb,e first uses Korean values of per capita Ine«as, population, a@d the 
ratio of the current account balance of payseafcs deficit to total dsssstic 
resources to calculate the nanss fro® cross ~coratzy recessions in itdeh 
these variables appear as explanatory .facto?® j , the second also ~m&3 
Korean values of per capita incoe®6 and population ,bot arbitrarily assumes 
that the capital inflow rati© is &er©„ mSfrnmom betwem th©se sets of 
norms reflect the effects ©f foreign capital toflens at the. •wamm&XS^' high 
rates observed in Korea@ 
In 1 9 5 5 » the share of industry (asanafacturiag plus construction) 
in GDP was somewhat below that which would be ejected while the share of 
exports was very far below the average for a country of Korea's sis® and 
per capita incossne. By 1972, unusually rapid industrialisation fead 
1/ Die cross-country regressions used see from Chenery and §yr«pin (1975). 
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wujji 
C&aerved and lerm ladastri&l Stragtag© 
Observed Structural Shares in Ior©& 2 2 2 
Per capita GNP (1965 prices) $79 
Capital Inflow Ratio lo7% 
Siare of Investment in GDP 12o0 
Share of Exports in GDP lo7 
Share of Mfg. Exports in GDP oU 
Imports as Percent of GDP lOoO 
Primary Share of GDP k8o0 • 
Industry Share of GDP 13 oO 
Utilities Share of GDP 3»5 
Services Shar« of GDP 35.5 
Actual Capital 
Mora Structural Shares Inflow ,. 
Per capital income M 
Soars of Investment in GDP ih.h 20o2 
Share of Escorts in GDP 9.8 IQ08 
Share of Mfg„ Exports in GDP l o t 2o 9 
Imports as Percent of GDP 17.6 15*8 
Primary Smre of GDP 52o8 33o5 
Industry Smre of GBP 1hok 2Uo9 













ïià® mms ar® th@s© ©gtisated 
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reversed the pattern; industry's share was soastahat above the n&m visile 
the share of exports was nearly twice the norm when adjusted for the 
inflow of foreign capital« Ere® the figures shorn in Table it ®ay 
further be concluded that; 1) the share of primary production was probably 
lower than normal over the past 20 years j 2) the pace of industrialisation 
was more rapid than in many other countries} 3) the growth of aannfac-
turiag esports was unusually rapid and reflects a®?® than sisply eaieMsg 
vp to the norm after the dislocatiera caused by Japanese e©l@®iaX poliay 
and two wars j and, h) the growth &£ iim@atw.mk ms »typically asid 
too.quick to be attributed ®sr®3y to high i€s?®i|p. capital isflotys®*™ 
Miile it is apparent from the .©segiarlsons above that Ear©®1® 
industrial development has clearly b©@a e^perfe-ledj, this stosda mi mm 
more dramatically Ttfien the sources of I t em 's indsatrlalisatiea are 
compared with international asras, tfedag input »ora&gnsb tabless «¡aieh ®r® 
fortunately available foe* several years for IsE>@a, it is possible to 
msasure the contributions' of domestic deaand ssspaaaioa, ssperfe 'î p&agiosi, 
and inport substitution to industrialisation© Reogpaly speaking* the • 
jseasure used here deccaposes the increase of issdsstsy's shay® in @IP isto 
these three sources« where isoort substitution i s defined in teeas of the y changing share, for each industrial subsecfeerg of imports in total supply® 
y Si relative terras, 1972 was a recession year ia Kore% whidi explain 
the investment rate's proocLasity to the nam ia that ysarf imrmimssst 
was more than 28 percent of GIF 19&9 to 1971 ° 
2/ Hh® decomposition is that developed by CSmsssry (1969). Se© FranJŝ  Mm, 
~ and Westphal (1975), pp. 86-96 for additional details. 
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The sorarces of Korea's Mustrialigatios fr« I960 to 1968 
coa^ared below with craiely estreated eross-ccantry ma?m for tfe© ^m&h. 
of per capita iacease from $100 t© $200» (a© ©sti»t@s for ,te<§a fesv® . 
tajfortraately not been carried beyoad 1968®) Ifcils Import substitsti« 
contributed very l i t t le to Korea's iadtastrialisati<B% th® ^e^tfe ©£ smarts 
contributed mare than twice the relative amorab that is topically ass@ei-
at ed with the doubling of p®r capita iac «e fir em $100 to $200« fcfe 
makes this c®n?>arison alTth© more striMag is that dcriag this psrltd 
Korea's par capita incessa increased by c®3y 55 psreimt^ i s ees&rast t<§> the 
100 p-sreeat increase tsndssrlyiag th® m«a @sttei.t<s@e 
i • 
T4BIS 6 
Scsis°©es of ;Mwtrialis&ti©a 
Dcraestic Sasand Escort ' fiipoyt 
Large Country Horn 






j^mgion . j^atltotion 
2k , 21 
18 32 
So®c@s R?anks B i , and ¥©stghal9(197$)0 p„ 95 
to® say also •as® dsfea t@ ealselsfeê-th® ©sÄltet i®. 
@f s « e ® , sector by sector̂ - t© chassas là ©sfepsb 
than to. Ganges in sectoral shares i^ GIP m aborre*, 
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tables spanning the period from 1955 to 1973 at ro&ghly toeta-year 
intervals are available for Korea. But to insure that-th© analysis 
is meaningful, it is necessary to convert data for differ eat years t© 
constant (domestic or world) prices. This has so far been d o » may 
for the tables spanning 1955 to 1 9 6 8 , so that the analysis whioh 
is necessarily restricted to this period, In tiar% data as0® isst avail-
able at the sarae lertrel of detail for 1955» so that parts ©f th© saeXyais 
cover only i960 to 1968, However, in qualitative t®rw asd sgipegatesa 
the results for this psriod are net geeatly dl£f@reat fieesa thos® t te t 
would be obtained if the collate amalyiig e©ald b© esd.®.M@d t© 1973 c-
The top half of Table 7 ihws th© eoss»©®® of th© of 
aggregate output decomposed to indicate separately the r&L&tiv® ees&rite» 
tions of the prlssary, ajaaafaetwiags social cwwhead, e®ctsrse 
Between 1955 and 1 9 6 8 , the gemtb. of the sasef&efcigdag g@®fc«® v w r©ep@a,~ 
sible for »are than half of the gsposf&fa of aigg îsgai® gppoes «xfejMfeo 7M 
turna the ip?cwth of naouf actor ed g^aerba directly ae©oisat«d i w 15®8 
(8oU divided by 53 «2 expressed as a pereeet) of th© ijweas® is sasssfaatTOed 
output. The estimates shown uad@? th© tota l ©oil« fee se^e® 
include the source's indirect conferibcfcioa die t© islasid ia 
intermediate demand. Thus the eâ asisioa of asfc 3m ®saszfe©=> 
tm*iag but throughout the ec©aas$yP eoafcrilmfced 2k«2 (1209 divided 
by 53 °2) to the growth of manafactOTed output, tfeieh wmm that trace 
strong backward linkages fro® eaepcrts« Ia, contrast§ lap set sisfegtitsfcie©^ 
by 'ijhich is meant a fall in the share of $ag>®?ts ia total domestic ssgplyp 
TABLE 7 







2/ Based on data at constant world price s <, 
Source : Westphal and Kiqi (19?li)s Table K. 
Note: Figures nay not reconcile due to round-off error. 
(1 >ôQ and 1968) were first calculated at the 29 
converting to percentages« 
Direct Total Direct Total Direct ¿'û'C.î  
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1 p. 
«X 
_ 1 . .1. 
All Sectors 89.0 80.5 11.2 20.2 
1 y '-.O 
1960-1968 ; Manufactured Goodo^/ 
Exporting Sectors 
Import Conpetiug Sectors 


























All Manufactures 81,7 7li.O 15.1 2lu3 3.2 1.7 
1/ Based on data at constant domestic prices. 
2/ Includes "other J1 
> 




Gro-i-jth contributions between 1955 and 1£o0 
sector level and then aggregated before 
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acccunted directly fcr little laare than two pareen of the ¡^®wth ©f 
msofacturing. Its total contribcbica was wen less^-iistücatiEg thst 
lagscrt substitution generated indirect deasaads on sectors havisg hig&sr 
than average requireffisats far tssperted irsberssdiate isparts. 
In the botte« half of Tabi© the ^-«wfeh of ¡asOTfaettsred mtptít, 
is. decomposed according to a Classification of seeters by traci© ©at@g®=y<» 
U^crtunately, the data reqpa&red fcr this d© s®fe ;@st»! bade t© 1955 o 
Ifee defisdtion chosen dassifies a sector as W<SS^«TIS?G!! IF ESPO tfeaa tea 
pereent of catpufc is aspcrted, as •íií̂ ort---ce«pet4Bi,|:-if » r © thaa %3® p@g>Q<ss& 
of dcssestic supply is i¡iparted¡, and aa "aoaáj^wt ©e^pstfeg" if i t i ® ' 
the sapcrt ncr the ia»ort share @ez&má tee ®®r@asfe0 " f c r " ssefe^s 
.. Y.- • -
conprise those in which both shar©® @xe©©t! tea p@r@€öte te*® t-fesa MLf 
the growth of output in the «ssepcrtisg seaters was dm to 
whijbe these sectars wäre the 'of ìssr© t&sn 75 ©f Ä s ipwfefia 
of Esasufactm-ed eoeports MÀ 20 p©re@s,t ©f'tti® ĝ oestfe emmims&W'$MSo, 
!toethel©ss$ the ©xpansisa ©f deasostie émm¡ñ plomad & mjcr gorfe ̂  ss§y 
be sem either by its eostribKfeioa to t&s of a l i naraafaetwis® 
^hieh is nearly 75 paressi j, or Sf th@ total »piitraä® «f t&© 
coatriirafcion of the seetsrs la t-feleà eagwts wn®3® l@ss t&aa tea psresst 
cratprafc .in 19680 Cfaly amcag the @®ct@fs tfoat had aotóaport 
ccäs5>6itizsg status by 1.968 was ispept. substìt-B&iig® t&@ so®5 es et ESS»® tàaa 
tesa per cent of output growth® 
1/ Based on esq̂ crt and istori sharss ia 1968«, 
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Sis figuras presea&ed abcnm d®©astrat© th&t th.© gpowt??, 
©f esqjcrts lias played a dœeisaffifc rois is l§r©&8s d®r@l^esatp 
fer rwighly 20 psreeat ©f the of agrégat® ©atgfEfe bete®®®. 19>f> 
and 1968 whea baokwsrd liakag® ©ffeets throogfe th© ûmmû fer 
Sapats are i&eludedo Tiers is m®rj ±adieati©a that ifes e©atedteM,@a 
h&a fessa ©roa g^eater siace Î9ô8a parhapa sppeoaehissg; 35 psreeat ©fis? the 
period froa Ì 9 6 8 to 1 9 7 5 « Forfcfeapss®r®s these mtimim mâ&?stst® t&s 
fa l l cœtribKfcioa ©f es^crt p-astĥ  feu? tta ealy isdireet coateâMia 
iaelwied is that dv& t© th@ dsrived d«aad f ® dœsetie&Oy p2*©iiffi©sd 
taberffisdiat© ¿spots. TBO additioasl isdir@©fc ©ff®efea say fe® diet̂ igaiis.Lisdg 
a Bffîltiplier effect de® to iasreased eossi®gsti©a â3sr©st»sat ©sfe tfeâ 
additiœal iacoae earasd thrcaîgh. «sEpcrfe aad s^œt r@Xat@d ©eti'çS.tiQsi 
©adg a fareiipa ŒdMjgs effeet du® to iJ&3r®âg®d predasti©® sî&ôte pessifela 
by & rise la f creici ©xehaag© reeeiptso 3&©st® ©ff®ets are esst dtasati© 
•5sh©re factors of prodactioa ïssuM hâve ©t&srsis© tessa tek t&sy 
' ala© ©parate foy âacreasiag aHoeatiY© ©£fi©i<saey iSmjw®1 t&@ dszseti© 
rescwce eost^ at shed a?? prises2 of @scp@?ts is l@ss thsss th@ atoskrer p*i®®d 
valss of the fcreiga ®sehaag?3 r®eeàpfcs» Ftetïfesgr©,, tfess® sgEeefe© my 
i&crease ©ithar cerreat m? fstw© Gommgt±œïs th© Xatter tÈroÊ gh. âs£3?©ûsiag 
the rate ®f ia^astsaat o To detenAa© th© ¡s&ipitM© @M 4ir@©feâ,@a tàâs© 
effeets requires a sopMstieated gessarsi ©qsàMforlmi secd®i ©f a tjp© th&t 
has set y@t basa eoastr&cted fa? JSsrea» Stostheleasi, th®r© îs mfMme® 
to s-oggest that these Ssdir®et effeets b&TO «pit® IsEg-ertissè ia 1er ©a» 
Korea has been relatively suceesafsl im fiefisg as l̂e-passfe f « 3 
its labor force® T/M2e only a csmie mmw?®s, tMs is iadieat<M 
fall in the mm^loymmt rate fro® a peak of 803 g@resst ia, t© ite 
cOTreut level of ltd percest« It is veey litely that Äof® tresM 
been serious xuoeaplqyia&nt, at least .in urbas srsasj, had wt csŝ isrfes 
light, labor-isctensive jssmufaetTOSs grown so rapidly «> At this ia 
tte inference that can reaaonaMy üs f r « ®stfeit@s of sfcgm f£ 
enplagnnank due to espwta0 fabl© 8 pr©s®a&g @sttet®s teSsaa a 
study based on ijgaut-asfcpixfe data« fh@ ©^X^sssk iaeltafied im, 
the "total" esttaates seeoosfes «f ly f ® ttefc ps^sS^eä is tia,® 
production of Intermediate goeda ®e®d ia e© t&at wAt&^lias sad • 
foreign exchange effeets ©a «ple-fasst er® s©§Xoet@do Urea m9 gs^srfes 
are seen to have accounted far MH»© than ms ^partes? <af . 
essplepssafc and close to tea psressfe &t total äa Î TQo 
contribution of <^mm±m t@ tesreasod is enrs® ESS5® 
iapressive. The sarn sto^y £3Ms tShat h^mm 1^60 ssd ISTOj) t&a 
of e^orts was responsible fcr 38 „3 percest ©f tSs® gpesffeSi @f eQslspssst ' 
i s Hasofacturing and 32©? poreeat of the ©£ total e^fsiila 
Korea has also b®m mumsasML i s äs^easiag tJa© dsgs?s3 of 
capaeity •atiHa&tiea withia tfo© i^sifaetmlsg seetepo IS?® sssi ^e&f^l® 
statistics shewing th® tread of capacity mtiMsatim rates es 
electricity wag® data and d®fte® 100 p®>eaat ©apuelty sfeiHsgtiig® tö b© 
V Both estimates ar© inclusive of iadär@et ©splep^sat fey <ssp«>tso 
TMUS 8 





Ssfsccag Colbs Westpiaal (1975), Tabi® 1» 
lotes The WAW eieployseat «astiaste® glToa bj Cole sad Hestphal £©r I960 
hm® beoia eohver&ed to corre&poatì to ih® ''B® ©gtìss&tea far 1$6$ 
and 1970 bj applyirag the ratio of B̂® to the estiaat® for 
1966 to the corre spoadisg figure for 19é0 « 
to pXasfe oprati©a 2k hsms ® 365 a . Gm tM® basisi 
the cepaeity utilisatioa rat® tsitMs sa®fa<st®jiag m a is ©git&eat®̂  
to h&T® iasreased at aa sgasasi ecsepcraM rat® ©f 7o2 ì7o? 
par cast ia 1962 to 31® 9 percosfc ia 1971 (fcfe® g®ff i M à r©siQ,ts 
1/ 
ar® tate® dog® aob ®st®sd bey®Ed 1971)° Si terss of asag®?© 
31 p®pcesfc eap&eity 'efciliaatioa (mi ©assTes sisjgls ®MJ?fe 
operati©®, throaghorafc ali of iadmstey) is qait® by 
dardso it is aot possibl© to state "Ghette? ©M by h®?? t&© 
<sspaBsic® of @sp«x*ts cojxtriboted to th@ iscrea®® la eap&eity 'aMIàssfeàg&a 
tbsre is little doubt it played a sigaifi.easfc rei® <3 
V Ssa E a mà Emon (1976)» Tabi© 2S flEj g@ri@a<> 
I960 1966 
Direct Eraployaent la Shorts 






Direct Eaìplô Taent in Esporta 2oli 
3°7 
3°Ia 
6 0 ? 
Most difficult to assess is the isnpact of exports en economic 
efficiency. The determinants of comparative advantage are mesy sad eossplsx« 
They include elements such as the. natural resource ©Moment, labor skillss 
learning by doing and other dynamic phenomena, sad risk and uncertainty s 
t̂ iich are either difficult to quantify or have not been quantified with 
sufficient precision in Koreafs case* Nonetheless, to the degree that Korea's 
comparative advantage during the 1960s raay be said to h&v© bees in labor 
intensive as opposed to capital intensive activities a partial assessment 
is possible. Table 9 gives average labor~«apital ratio® for ©shorts ®&d 
for the replacement of imports by domestic production« Them ratios ar© 
-«»sighted averages, in which the weights are proportional to each s©etor5s sham 
in exports and imports re spectively» For coaparativ® purposethe lighted 
average factor intensity of domestic output is also sho^a in the table, ' 
Furthermore,, since these estimates a re based on input«output statisticŝ  both 
direct and total factor intensity aeasures e®a h® pr®mnt®&0 Hwsm©r9 for 
technical reasons having to do with the ©stistatiosi prosed«1© m mil &s for 
substantive reasonŝ  the direct factor ©stisaat@s er® both tha sost irsliable 
as well as the most relevant. 
On examining these ©stiaatss® ©a© finds that manufaeturad ©shorts 
wrs more labor intensive than iaportgs of saennfaotures in ©very y®ar0 to 
tiie other hands total exports were acre eepital intessive than ths brasdls 
of total imports. The latter is to b® esqplained by the effect of lorea's 
natural resource endoment on the cOTpositlca of its trad© in primsy product®! 
Korea eaqaorts relatively capital intessive minerals sad isports highly labor 
intensive agricultural products. 
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TABLE 9 



















Source? festphal and Kim Q* 
The labor-capital ratioŝ  by sector, on which tUas«atlsatos 
ars based are those for a single year =~= 1968» ffeusa charges tfcs 
in the estimated factor intensity of & particular aggregai© ar© da® sololy to 
changes in its composition. Comparing direct factor intensity ©stte.tss 
across years* one may conclude that Korea's Bomfactored assort© «©̂ ©.30 
increasingly more labor intensive orer time while its sa&attfactured iEsports 
Labor»CapitaS- Ratios 












































teeded to becoias » e capital isjkatsiv©® la faet^ tshere&s E®5®»8® 
jaasaafactured exports were lsss labcr tfeaa greroge sagisfae» 
tm-iag in 1 £óos thay were asm»© lab«? ;lsfc®j£3iv® hj 1 ?é8 0 iSaseif 
iEpcs?ts wsre mere capital tebea-sive tlnaa srsrag© smixfastisdsg tfereâ sesafe 
the perioda 
At least betweea 1960 mà th© sMfts over ttes ia tfe© 
cospositioa of manufactared asporta ©M xf&on tresp^ated isSa 
chaages ia direct labcr-capital rati©«,,, tfcsas s@fC3@3t tlmì> Tfceoa sams 
lag its comparative ad-vasitag© isitSsà& ih® E^^cvc&isr&ag s@€iie?P -c&sr® 
Tffisldlled labcr waa abtsadasst sed capital scarso« Sf^galy l » « s 
©f tSie groìfth of â ctèit'sa?al tenuta * li mmmx, aaM $&at total estete 
were beeoadag sacre labor is,t@asivo rel&t&TO te ispertso 33*89« 
coasltasioas feoM alaost eqtsal2y -e&sa ca» cEfÈfeaas t&s total faet^? te&se*» 
sity ©stimt©ss Biay aesd asfc jtâ ly* y@s©ra?e®a t3®sf© 
allesated i&efficieatly %rf.tMa th© pnlsssy e©etcr<> ŝalatiT® c&assi&T»©© 
of s@m s&aerals Xed to «g^cst ef »ssa it asy miL3L fesro 
©fficiest to iagucrt- foodg^aias givea tes&'s poca? slJisat® ls®ào 
AacfcSìar stec^ Etesg (ISfé)* isŵ s'tigsifeas faet©? ijs^msitj 
of trade «p to 1973® CGC© aHofjsa©® is sad© f©? d&£fgg>e80G8 ia '®stSsatì@a 
s£3t&ods aad ia the presaaafce.tloa of v@8eù&fts> Bsog's ds&lex&as fe? sassai-
twssl prodocts over the paried 1?6o to 1$58 s?r© • t^ess 
gìve-a above» Hcwever, M s 5j®r©stigatiem strcsigly teSàoates tfc&t te®?® 
has b®ea aa appreciable iacrsase ia tfea eapital i&toasity of siamfactó̂ edl 
«aperte afta? 1968, particolari^ wiih respect to th® 
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total factor intensity* Si parts this is' due to capital deepeafx.s in the 
manufacturing sector and rapid increases in labor productivity, as Hoag 
documents by using capital-»labor ratios» by sector, specific to sash p'ear» 
Additionallys particularly after 1970, it saay also b© traced-to iaers&sod 
escorts of cements steel, fertilizer, and textiles and raieesll©Eeo"as 
items based on petrochemical derivatives« Either diraetly or iadira<stl;rs 
all of these products require capital intensive production methods in plants 
subject to severe economies of seal©« In the latter eoanset'ions givea that 
the domestic demand for these eoassoditiss is to -be set tiirowgh desaatsti® 
production, temporary exports @©a b© s£fleiisk as it giswslfce tSa©©(¿in-
struction of larger plants ̂ dthout ssqserlsaeing initial excess eapaeity m & 
therefor®'reduces the cost of realising greater' ©©oaesaiea of seal®0 ffea® 
exports of cements steely and fertiliser during the first half of tho 3570a 
m j well have been in Korea's dynamic coKpar&iiv® adv&ategSo It i©. legs el©ar 
that saiae conclusion holds in regard to tha realisation > of the «sefejard 
linkage from textiles snd plastic products through tho donatio prodaetioa of 
petrochemicals. 
Treads is the aggregate laber^sapital rati® sad faetsr . 
ities sdtMs saaasfacturisg deserve brief ssssaticao Usisg data Mmgts 
study these treses are ia Table 8» rati© a® 
rose alaaost eoskiasosusly dmdag th© first half of 1 
aad then. fell almost conbimoasly throtsgh 19?2S risisg is 1f?3 0 M 
tur% both the oafcpsfĉ capital aed OE&p&b-labcr ratl@s were risiss ec^imossSy 
- ~ 
during this entire periodj the output~capit©2 rati© rose by 191Z to, 
more than-twice its value in 19&), whil® the ratio i&es^ased 
by a-aerly 100 parceato (Catgut is' here ss&swed by valo© add©»0) 
Total factor productivity tires «baft tetBsss Ifde -and 19?3o ' 
Bie sources of increased aggregate fserfeej? isclad© b@feh 
changes in the ccsapositioa of th© sggpogafcc fast®» prosSae» 
tivity at the micro level<, Sj© fcr&fr rafloefcs ta^s&gsd ©eeass&g 
efficiency throsgk chsagss in tfo© all©ss&5,ea of s»egi®®p©@si laite* 
constitutes "pare" productivity i&cteh is tm* »sy b© <fe© 
changes ia technique or to t@cteol@gioQl yzogrma at tSie sier© Isf©! (as • • 
weH as increased factor vtellsatloa}» The?® mfc^ftaasft®^ bom ss® 
sufficiently detailed iavsetigatio»^ to dlofeisgaisSs bstessa t&sa© eoi^sss 
in the lorssa ess©* 
1&M3J2 
Factor Urn is 
IjtfO 1 . 1970 
Valu© (adllioa 1970 0S$) 3 9 2 • 1,803«Q . 
Eapli^Bsat (thousand parsons) hT? 958 -"SpUil 
Capital Stock (million 1970 US$) ??2o0. 1,273.2 2,137c8 2,e>0§oS. 
Labor-Capital Ratio „62 o?S ' 068 o?2 
Val'«® iddsd"Gaoits.1 Katio • r,?A 063 1 o* Is. 
Tales Added-Labar Ratio 062 • ,81; 1 „2$ 1o5S> 
Soœroej Bang (1976), capital stoek, Tabi® A« 22$ j ïabl© 7«6j 
value added s Tabi® â027« 
The «spansioa of labcr̂ iateKsiv©, light msaf&etTariŝ  aspects 
coatrib\jt®d to the observed trend 3k tke> Iabes?~c&p4.t8l rati© ia assssfae-
• twisag, both directly «ad iadireetly, It did so isdireetly 
perastttiag ggleetive isf>ept substitution» !Ti&d©& by th© agg^if. • 
figures gives ia Table ? the ispcrtaat roX® played by ispspt nfo'ifei"̂ -
tion ia soa® sectors, x-feich is cffasfc ia th© eg^egats by so^It® ir̂ xaet 
substitutism {i<>eop a risiag ratio &f iŝ erts to d«3stie supply) ia 
Y 
other sectors» IMs ®ay b® s&m ia tesax Tn&Xo 1 «folate grsŝ stg 
varioss ii&iices relevant t© garaging the strmstepal <&sr<j9 that lass 
occurred withia Korea's ®Em?s.ctBi-iag seat^o 
At a yet mate dis£gp?egat©d festeesa 1f?60 sad fc^crt 
substitution coratribtzfced subst&s&ialXy (i0@»s thm 20 pcwyeat) t© 
the p-owth of 12 out of the 80 ssmf&e&Triiag sectors distimaisfced ia fefe© 
analysis fircsa vfixieh these ©stimtes are dmro« Asasg ihesej t«s 
1/ Also observed is the role pX'ifcl by ̂ ^^ y i r — *o - ( respect to imports ©f ster&yi ~ V t - < ^ -
tie®. goods» Xaports of ifeas?.e » c s c - t ̂  ̂  'television, sats, and other electrical » n _ c j l . - «-r the most part prohibited, so that tbo ft * <x n -<• 
products is satisfied only after dosaosr&3.c ŝ od&vtio?* la 
the' government has massged to delay their prav&jma iss qa'-ur̂ i-Aes 
until thay are produced locally. *shieh ri&s to e, p̂ ttera to 
term «import substitution" should aots strictly «pettSciag, fcs «ejjpl&MS. Tfc® 
mathematics of the sources of growth eaXê d-etle® reeogptf «es i&is distiaŝ loa 
indirectly by as signing a very Iok t̂ igfet to tkase eeotc-rs la ths 
import substitution estimate as a result of their initial by mtilX afe-oKs Aa 
domestic desaaad» 
2/ F®3 th© scwe® ©f tkls esd tiss ©tatcs-astsf, 8Q@ aafi 
Hat 11W Tables K SXB& I0 
- Ii2 -
pifoducìng fertili?.©rs s patreleam ps-od̂ cta, mohiass, electrica! 
eqsipsssnfc aad productatìrogss ste®X iŝ si'sc, p^ps? sk.<! paaarbc&pàj b&sie 
iac^gauic cherócals,, sad cast asd fgs?g«d ste&i (listetì t??«*®? &T 
nsü&tire ccn&r-ibution ©f issport st&stiteMon) « F^tämwf-re, 
substituticsi playsd ea e^ea largar i». a sseÉfess* of isd̂ '-s'î a 
stetsr • intestala « BonsfcbaLessr. S^spt eìx&'os 
tesraased, fading to z^tirs f.^rc ^fe^i^MeSj, i® 39 <$£ ®slsssfee=' 
tesfisg s®etea?s (axĵ  aigfefc oet ©? p^Iif^y a s ^ 
was the sewa® of s.<sra tfcsa 20 p^corÄ ©f £<sr 2© • 
aectcrso JncXuded mmg tfcss® "ss?® sedere jpodteefoig mTlcsss 
produets at differenfc XsvsXs ©f ̂ ^¿on^Er mmdeetiS'QS 
p?cjSQetsa taber and pSy-jocd, ¿p^rul gesf? ec-v̂ äserios,, elosèr^es mä 
eXeetrieal CKjaipasat r at the gas© the ©smt̂ feefeic® ©£ stessile . 
des^atì eoqsaaston excosöed 80 p^ce&t Ss* 53 oot e£ "feti® 80 
seeters® Boss the iapgrtaaaoe ©"? gswèh obs®?^ £a th© 
aggregate casries etw to t&t« isÄiriöml sscriisr-a ss weJUL« ' 
The pati®?» of graffe ,fraa to 1 f t e clos^ly 
ossa of soXeetive ©spart ©spamieaj, largi^y ÌM th© teiHtasiTO fiatarsi P 
coepXed with seüLsctiv® Isfort in soccer© 
basic iafoerssadiate producta <> k sa^ re orasi. ßt'aöy« gyh 
the souroes of gposrbb throusft. 1?73* Bis 5?esuXts ®£ Ma stiâ r ss1® raie^w,«. 
aat©2y net ccgaparable with the ©bor® .fcr t&© peräsa 
thrmsgh t<?6part3y beeauas a c&fföê nt wsetts» c&assifie&tlon ara 
of aggregation are ,usedi but ware i^crtartly because the ostissttes 
all based oa data in <r®r©at prices„ Shsy acmtholess docoRSsfe the 
coatiKoatica. of selectivity is both «apart @KpaBs;].!3La istpes't 
tioao Equally iŝ jorfcasb, Ss&'s results issilsate the begAĵ sL̂ go ̂  a 
tread tcwrd an increa.«*» ia the relative i^cs?taace ©f the hsasy 
trial sectors in the grcsrfch of asamCacttiriags, both tsith r^s^et it 
y domsstie xsarkeb asd esqpcrtso This is teoiig&fc is the tsM® bgOUK?< 
Direct Gro^x foafyifetd^ i _ JL96Q > 1973 
Scs&sstie JkmM Ssiport Izaport 
^ Eissmgioa R&ietaigei t^tal 
lg6o - j.968 
~Ligfet Industry 1 0 . • 
Heavy Industry 6 ^ r* ̂  
Total lad^iry B^f • ¿Sit 
Light BMustry feo«! £X„8 =06 • 6l0l 
Ksaty Industry 3e„3 ' 9.1 .„6 1̂ -9 
Total Industry • fT? ifi^o 
L 1973 
Total "Sfustry 73,1 26.8 C„1 1 € M 
Ssssreai Ssh 0957)f Table 
Based on data at earrenb prices«. -Tet&X3 say ast reeeasil® dao to 
r©mid«off error» 
1/ la Esrean par lancet the heairy industrial sect<s>s ftwxLoriie sm^^-wisa! 
" and electrical aswshiagry as well as transport ©qsipsassb and basic is&sr»-
a@di&te products® 
The 'sectcrs sipQriersKiag reXp.tiv&Iy imbstsa&iaX AsspctriJ substit'a« 
tim between 1$>8 and 1973 iscXaded spimsisg testil© feferies\, 
rebber products, chemicals, iroa aad steal* fiKd.shed aasS&I ppodrofee, ffsd 
saaeXscirical mcM-Hery* With the ®£o<sptioa @f ths last tire l^as^i®*?., 
topc^t substitution was canceKfcrated la tfe® ppodaetio® of is&EFissdiet© 
goods, aad took place largely, ia 1S6& tc Ki/m ef t&ia 
sî stitsfcion was doe to the of basic steel grodtocts assd pets?©» 
chsrateal derivatives is ssas&vm plists« teosag tha sectors elsssiir.'.sd 
as hoawy î diss-try, those ocsst-rJ,teti-2g to lii© p.m&nsiLm of ersrcptiR 
.over • 1968 to 1973 were ¿ftesa.egj.sp sta©X fialefeed sat&I p3©;lv..atsJ, 
833& electrical moMmry zgpjdjmnmo 
As has already bees i®»iest<s<ls ©jjs of t&a rsBaffte-bl© i m ^ w m 
of Kereaa is&histri&lizatiea its sd.ect-i'fifeyp «.ilea eppaars 
to hay® Qimlaislied scs®s®hat 0» t^e «qjwirfc side tet emfoimtw to b® 
with respect to iapce-t ffdbotitiifeic&u iSr^ac a^ragmsssrs fesf© ston 
thesiselves to be highly rsspoasire to cj^^tmitl®» to with. 
actable eaaa^les beiag the rapid rise of «ig «/„ports la t-a® 
and later the quick espaaaicsi of ©leetroides sad fos&weaa? mpts&m* 
Sisd3ar3y, aAscaUassoras saar̂ &etm'esj, t?i© istrust?sr© of ̂ M.sfe ¿s castimsuOy 
have loetg besa a «fcoss&o eagxiFt asstss?» F^orts aos&f&elftss 
®sMM,t a relatively stable eecp3.pit3.oa co^arisosa to the struct®'© of 
iffiporb si&stitutim, tihicfe has "aadorgost» aoofcLm&X efewtg® as w 
are developed j, often imclsr gc^grweat initiative» after tUs* 
isitial rooiad of isgjort stfcstitiatioa is. ths light eosagrasisr goods ±B?lastyi®@,,' 
hS " 
t-frich was stare co? less completed by the early 1960s# impact 
terestment concentrated first oa f@?tilia®»? mid am-m^-p Vhm m getro» 
ctaGieal derivatives aad electrical agpaiaoca&j,. aasS est 
basic petrochemicals s iroa sjjd st©sl3 aad traaspcri eqoiipKsafeo 
®te ragpid growth of fas-alga ecsch&sgs feosa «sswrte tea 
beea a key factor that hm ssade possible the seGLeotiviiy ©f S^srt 
s-abstittstioa., m'iicli ia two largely ©^Xaias tiie saall part it fe&g glaysd 
ia the aggregate 0 Farfchamsr®, th^ parent of aa «©«sacŝ r*» ̂ ¿y^sfelv© 
advaaiage is a ssstter asfc ©aly the ©f e^pepte sad inĝ -fes 
bat also of their size relative t© dassatiu sM emm8&&m<> 
®ie shares of both experts sad igj,c?te la GIF f?®?© at iss 
ead of the K®»eaa War, so that to pisms its eesspm&iv© gmaat&g© fcas 
required that Korea iscs?©as® the m ^ m of befth« Ssscs't 
is aataralSy s®all 3s the aggregate ̂ tm the tsfesr® of i^mba is rislsfe 
Tb tiara* selective iapcrt substitution has p«rsitt©d tfce 
scarce ixx>r©i5tsmt resources in om or a few saeters «& a tis© astl ta&rs&y 
.enabled greater exploitation of ecaj&oa&ee of seale aad of the listens 
sgEcasg closely istsrrelated activities« T&usj, ia laaay m o m , ispert 
substitution has been delayed mxhil dmx.ma wm suffisisst to s^o^i 
efficient scale plants® Tsis is s»t to' d®cys hmw7<w9 iŝ sE»t sj^si« 
tubiogj ia ctbse areass ssost aot&bly pak'odi'Sffi.ciOs 3sid ffist^ssbli^s ̂ tsas 
probably premature, as it certainly appears to hsv© feeea if 
doing aad other "erfeeraa1 ecoas8®rM nagieafcedo 
h= Incentives and Efficiency 
Additional evidence regarding the efficiency of Korean resource 
allocation may be found by examining the siagaiiuds and structures of industrial . 
incentives, including both protection measures which distort the structure of 
domestic prices vis-a-vis world market prices and subsidy Measures tshieh increase 
factor remuneration without directly affecting product prices. Much of î e 
literature on trade and development presumes that any substantial deviation of 
the exchange rate from a unified equilibria® (ready "free trade«) rate and 
large deviations in protection sad subsidies saoag industries cases resources 
to bs allocated inefficiently.* There are issny reasons' to que sties, this views 
the protection of infant industries, the need to raise revenue fro® tariffs, 
and the ability to achieve social and polities! goals through meiixpulation of 
the price mechanism argue in favor of soae divorgeaee between world raarket 
and domestic prices. World market prices, homrer, provide a standard against 
which the effects of incentive policies can be appraised«, large gLwrgmo®® 
from world market prices suggest tho possibility» #ien other justifications 
are lacking, that allocation of resources is inefficient. 
A detailed quantitative analysis of jbacsative policies is 
to reach meaningful conclusions regarding their impact on efficiency. B&.eh a 
3/ 
study has been conducted only for 1966» Its principal results are 
suasmarized in the remainder of this section. 
In Korea, legal tariff rates have never been a good naasur® of the 
divergence between world market and domestic prices- First3 m©xxy izstports 
1/ tJestphal and Kim (197U) , summarised in Frank, lira, sad Westphal (19?$)» 
Chapter 10, 
are exempt from duties, including intermediate goods imported for us© to 
produce exports and capital goods imported for various uses. Second, . 
tariffs are virtually prohibitive for a number of ccafflsodities with the 
result that these are not imported. Domestic production is sufficient to 
satisfy local demand at or below the world market price plus tariff, In 
these two cases, the legal tariff overstates the nominal (iaeos ectusl) 
degree of protection« Thirds « y imports are subject to controlsTiis 
domestic price of such commodities can be. higher than the world market price 
plus tariff if demand at that price exceeds the pemitted voluaa of imports „ 
For .the study of protection in 1968 it was thus necessary to 
compare domestic and world market prices directly. The divexigeaaee for a 
particular commodity is conventionally expressed in terras of the noaiaal 
rate of protection, which is the percentage excess of the dosueatie over the 
world market price, with the latter, converted into its dosaeetlc current 
1/ '¿i 
equivalent at the prevailing exchange rate.5* ' — Average rates of legal 
and nominal protection are compared in Tables 13 and lh below according to 
several classifications of commodities. 
1/ In the case of commodities that are not exported, world price refers to the 
c.i-.f. .import price| for exports, world price refers to the f.o.b. e:xpo:rt 
price. 
2/ Note that this convention implies that nominal protection is equivalent, 
from a resource allocation point of view, to an actual tariff rate, were 
it imposed at the same level. As Bhagwati {196b') has shown, this is not 
always true where markets are imperfect. The nominal rate -tends to be. 
greater than the equivalent tariff when domestic production or quotas &rs 
monopolized, which means that nominal protection rates in the Korean context 
• may overestimate the protective effects 'of Import controls in a» equivalent 
tariff sense. 
- -
Korean (legal) tariff rates in 1968 were quite low by comparison 
with other developing countries J/ Furtherjstore, the protection potentially 
afforded by tariffs to domestic sales (i.e., of domestically produced output} was 
generally realized only in wry small measure» Th® average tariff, rate 
across all commodities in 1968 was h9 percent whereas the average nominal 
protection rate was only 13 percent «5/ Thex>e was thus a great deal -of water 
in Korean tariff rates, with this being most ©aidant for industrial rather 
than for primary products» • 
In view of these results, it is testing to conclude that isaport 
controls, added little to the protection provided by the tariff structure. 
However, to make this conclusion valids it is necessary to analyse import 
restricted commodities separately„ This is because legal tariff rates in 
1968 uere the sum of two elements $ a regular r&te that was legislated sad 
a special rate that was administered and used to mop up the scarcity premiuae 
resulting from import controls* Special tariff rates were iisposed on 123 
commodity groups out of a total of 36> within the price comparison survey 
sample| these accounted for 13»7 percent of total domestic sales •Kithia 
the sample. 
Final judgment on the teportanea of it&port controls thus rests on 
a comparison of nominal protection with the regular tariff rats alarm „ 
Table 12 gives estimates *shich are weighted averages over all coiamoditiss 
for which nominal protection exceeded the regular tarif rat®. The basis fn? 
1/ The basis for this and the following comparisons with other enveloping 
• countries is found in Little, • Scott, and Scitovsky (1970) end Balassa end 
Associates (1971)« 
2/ In all casesj legal and nominal protection rates are averaged using domestic 
.sales in world prices as weights? effective protection rates (see below) ara 
averaged using value added at world market prices as weights. 
classifying commodity groups by trade category is the same as that esrploŷ d 
for classigying sectors in Table 7 above (see pag© 32), 
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Export 5 6h»9$ 56 S% 
Import Competing 09 hXj 18.0 
Bon-Import Competing • : k6 66,2 26.9 
Other- h : 9&o6 36,7 
All 77 62 c 6 26 o 6 
Sources tfestphal and Kim (19?U), p. 31. 
Except for the commodity groups in the export category,ijî porfc 
controls did afford some commodities significant additional protection. 
However,, the total of 7? commodity groups included here accounted for only 
11 «h. percent of total domestic sales witMn the sassple, so that in total effect 
Import controls were relatively unissportant. This holds even 
controls were imposed on competitive imports in the markets for eosaaodities 
representing 75.6 percent of all-domestic sales in the sampleM 
Me turn next to estimates of effective protection and subsidy rat©s 
for 1968„ These estimates are based on nominal protection, ratter than 
tariff, rates and further incorporate the effects of all.incentive policies 
1/ The last figure cited̂  however, represents a biased estimate of the impcsi~ 
tion of import controls relative to total domeside sales, for a commodity 
group?s inclusion in the price comparison sample based, in part, on the 
imposition of import restrictions» 
- $0 





Legal Protection 36„c? 9.6$? 3&.13É 
Nominal Protection 16 c 6 • 6O9 15 c 9 10 • ! 
Effective Protection 18,1 2.9 17 »1 »,9 






Source j Wèstphal .and Kim (X97U) <, Tableç "2,A as»! 2.B. 
Notes Agriculture includes forestry and fishingj »all8 industries refers 
only to commodity producing sectors. 
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ïfrf 
Effective Subsidy to 8 
Domestic Sales -26 o 2 O"! K •=2U«3 << o 
Exports 13.5 35*3' A *s .1 JL. 8.7 
Total Sales -13711 m,'f o<~ <1 t 37:9 





Notes The basis for calssifying individual sectors is the same as that 
employed in Table ? above (see page 32) = 
- 5 1 ' -
operating in 1968, including the esjport incentives discussed in Section 2 
above as well as subsidies granted to key import substituting industries^ 
Averages based on estimates made at the level of 1$>G commodity producing 
sectors are given in Tables 13 and lha In turn, irnex Table 2 gives estimates 
averaged according tc industrial classification. 
Effective protection calculations «press the impact of protection 
r-i / 
measures on value added .Instead of the gross price,-» 
The effective" protection rat® "or „9'for manufacturing output is a 
t-shole (see Table 13) thus indicates that protection measures on balance pro« 
vided no protection to value added in the manufacturing sectors, the protection 
on outputs being slightly more than offset by the cost r&isiag effects of 
protection on inputs« It may further be seen that protection measures afi-„rde<? 
an implicit subsidy to primary producers, particularly in the agrieultural sectors 
Both of these results <=-» low protection to simufaet-uriag, and hilsiser protection 
to primary producers — are nearly -unique to Korea., as most other devslopiiig 
countries protect industry at high levels and at the expense of priimy pr̂ dactioR. 
Effective subsidy calculations further include the impact cf credit 
and direct tax preferences. These incentive measures do not change unit value ' 
added in world prices, howsver they do affect the composition of value added 
and profits after taxes«. These subsidies were incorporated in the following 
ways The total direct tax liabilities of all firms were reapportioned feo ©a®" 
1/ The subsidy due to the export-iraport link system is not included, but it is 
known to have been very small. For details regarding the estimation pro® 
eedure^ see Westphal and Kim (I97li),- Chapter 3® 
2/ Formally., the effective rate of protection is defined as the percentage 
excess of domestic over world market value added, where the latter equals 
• the difference between the world market price of the product and the Cv>*t 
of its inputs at world prices. 
sector on the basis of its share in the total tax basej i,©^ it was 
assumed that each firs, would have paid the same average tax rate on its 
net income under a neutral tax policy„ The difference between the reap-
portioned tax liability and a sector's actual tax liability is th® 
estimated tax subsidy, which could thus be negative as well as positive 
depending upon whether the sector actually paid a higher or lower tax rate 
than the average. Interest subsidies mre determined in an analogous 
fashion, assuming that all seniors wattd have paid the sme average iatex "-••at 
rate'on outstanding loans, that rat© being determined as ths ratio of total 
interest payments by all sectors to total loaaa outstanding,, Tu vol • direct 
tax and interest subsidies were then added to each sector's value added 
in domestic prices„2/ The effective subsidy rate is the percentage excess of ' 
this adjustad value added' over value added at world market prices» Siae® 
the sua of all tax and credit subsidies over all sectors is vevot the weighted 
(by world market price value added) average of all effective subsidy rates is 
•equal to the weighted average of all effective protection rates«. 
Under the incentive system prevailing in Koreas preferential credit 
goes largely to the manufacturing sectors while the primary sectors benefit 
from lower tax rates» As nay be seen in Table 13s the net result of credit' 
and tax preferences in 1968 was implicitly to tax industry further at 'She 
expense of primary activity,, Adding these preferences reduces effective 
protection to industry front »0,9 to -6*$ percent and increases that to primary 
o/ production from 17.1 to 20 „9 percent 
1/ This adjusted value added is an estimate of what value added in the 
sector would have been if there were no'tax sad credit preferences 
and net factor returns were unaltered from their actual value under 
the incentive policies followed, 
2/ Industry is here defined to include beverages and tobacco and processed • 
food. Removing these sectors from industry changes the average effective 
protection and subsidy rates to 5.7 and 0»3 percent respectively. 
Overall, the average level of protection'and subsidy was quits 
low in Korea compared with other countries«, because the exchange rate in 
1968 was not greatly overvalued«, The levels ox protection and subsidy for 
manufacturing were especially low. 
Of courses these results obscure difference in the in«xdane© of iaeentiv 
among particular industries and between exports and domestic .is we are'her 
most interested in the manufacturing sectors, Table lU presents estiE&ies for the 
sectors averaged by trade category with separate figures given for s^oi'ts and 
domestic sales. Starting first with, the results for all ®amifacturiags one 
finds that greater effective incentives were afforded to eaports than to 
domestic sales. By virtue of being able to ibsport their inputs duty free., 
exporters faced world market prices both for their outputs and for their 
tradeable inputs. The positive effective protection rate of 3 pereeat on ' 
esqaort sales reflects the implicit subsidy to exports through generous 
wastage allowances and preferential rates on electricity and transportation« 
in turn, export sales benefitted more -than did sales' on the domestic market 
from direct tax reductions and credit preferences, so that ail the incentives 
together yielded an effective subsidy rate on exports of 12 percent. By 
X/ 
contrast, the effective subsiĉ r rats on domestic sales was minus sine percent,, 
As among sanufaoturing sectors classified by trade categoky, the 
sectors exhibiting the lowest average effective• scbsidy rates on total sales 
are the export end non~import competing sectors. These are also the sectors in 
which the effective subsidy on export sales on average exceeded that on domestic 
1/ These figures are respectively 13,9 and -1»8 percent when beverages and 
tobacco and processed food are removed, from the average for total manu-
facturing o 
saleSo These sectors together accounted for 8U percent of Korea's 
1/ 
manufactured exports (at producer's prices) In 1 9 6 8 T h e share of 
exports in the output of the export industries was 36 percentj that for' 
the non-import competing industries was roughly 2 percent«- In tarn,, 
effective subsidy rates were highest on average in the import competing 
sectors, where domestic sales were highly protected. The share of ©srports 
in the output of these industries was less than two percent, However, 
the »other" sectors had aa export ""share of nearly W percent in their 
output, though the effective subsidy rats on domestic aalfas was over six 
times that exports» There thus appears to be a difference ia the response 
of the export and the «other" sectors to ©sport incentives. A full dis-
cussion of implications of this is postponed to the conclusion, though a 
test of the allocstive significance of incentives across all gsetors is 
discussed immediately below* 
As is widely taom9 effective incentive rates 'aeasured ex post 
reflect both differential factor remuneration rates sad comparative 
efficiency .differences,- so that it cannot be essertadaed without further 
evidence whether, for esc ample, "a high effective incnetive -rate is associated on 
the margin with higher than average profits or inefficient production» None-
theless, an appropriately signed snd significant correlation across sectors 
between effective incentive rates and a corresponding measure of resource 
allocation may be•considered presumptive evidence that incentives affected 
the allocation of reso-irceso This is particularly so in tfco Korean case, 
1/ Export shares based on Table 3oC«, Wsstphal and lira (19?U)o 
»ss -
for incentive policies were quite stable between at least the fear years frosa 
1965 to 1968o In turn 3 the mobility and educational level of the Koreas 
labor force j the rapid pace at which the capital stock was increased., and 
the absence of any clear evidence to the contrary, suggest that researees 
were quite free to move tox-iard profitable activities» 
Table 15 gives rank correlation coefficients between various 
measures of effective incentive rates and resource allocation« leitfasr the 
share of exports in output nor the growth contributions of escorts et-3 
significantly related.to effective protections Howevers export trade 
shares and growth contributions are significantly and positively related to 
effective rates of aibsid̂ . The result is striking, for it dsaoastrates 
the importance of tax and credit preferences ®aong the various export 
incentives during the latter 1960s and suggests that export incentives 
had a positive influence on the expansion of exports« 
Imports prompt the opposite conclusion. Since the correlation between 
the share of imports' in total supply and effective incentives is signifie®at 
and positive, it suggests that import substitution had progressed least in 
those sectors where the level of effective incentives to domestic e®l©s 
was highest. The correlations between effective incentives to domsatie 
sales-and growth contributions are not significant, though they are negative, 
which is what one would expect if import, substitution had progressed least in 
sectors where incentives were greatest. In effect, effective incentives to 
domestic sales seem to reflect relativî efficiency while effective subsidies 
to exports seem to reflect profit incentives» 
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TABLSJLg 
Ran!<̂ Ĉ relg.tioB_ CoeffileieatB̂  Bst̂ gen 
Effect-lye tttceQ^jT^H&j^s^sadj^soi^e^^Lo^tlcn 
Percentage 
Share of Imports Growth. Contribution 
la Output in 1968 of lagortsa 1960-66 
Effective Protection to Exports »»16 -»15 
Effective Subsidy to aborts „29 «26 
Legal Protection on Domestic 
Market 
Nominal protection on Domestic 
Market 
Effective protection to Domestic 
Sales 
Effective Subsidy to Domestic 
Sales 
Share of Imports 












3 O vLlj 
Source; Mestphal and Kim (197«), Table L, 
.lots s s The correlation coefficients were calculated at the 92 coœaodity 
producing sector level, inhere tiae series data on resource allocation 
are available» Coefficients equal to or greater than »16, .20, -and 
»27 (absolute value) are significant at the .10, »05, and .01 levels 
respectively under a two-tedled test. 
- ST 
$. Conclusion 
There are two aspects to the relevance to policy raakiag in other-
developing countries of Korea's successful experience with export-led indus-
trial development0 The first of these concerns overall development per-
formance and will be dealt with only in summary fashion» Hie second is of 
a more limited nature hut of potentially greater consequence. It involves 
the question of how to promote exports effectively sad efficiently» 
Korea's overall development performance since the policy reforms 
in 196U-5 has indeed been striking , and not merely on the narrow grounds 
of CNP growth rates alone. As was noted previously, Korea does not law a 
serious unemployment problem, either among skilled or unskilled labor, Xh 
turn, the distribution of income in. Korea appears to be quite eve»0 In fact, 
surreys reveal that con suction expenditure among Korean households tends to 
be more nearly equal than it is elsewhere in the world and that fro® 19&U 
to 1970 tliis distribution seemed to improved Exports have proven to be a 
powerful engine of Gil? grotrth and, due to their labor intensity¡, they have 
contributed greatly to rapid employment growth, which la 'turn has doubtless 
been a major factor in maintaining a relatively even distribution of income. 
Bat the Korean experiences, remarkable as it has been, doss not 
necessarily provide a model for other less developed countries, &s it 
reflects a number of special factors which are not likely to b© replicated 
in other countries» The most obvious of these is the high level of foreign 
assistance, particularly during the 1950s and early 1960s, i-ihich helped 
build-the infrastructure for subsequent growth. Foreign capital inflows 
1/ See Freak, Kim, and Westphal (1975), Chapter 11 for details ragardiag this 
and the following points» 
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from all sources have continued to be substantial» Given an average 
gross eapital-output ratio of about 2«5 over the past 15 years-, the average 
foreign capital inflow of roughly 10 percent of current prd.ce GNP over this 
period yields a contribution to the GIF growth rate of about four percentage 
points a year» Since the average rate of GIP growth has bsen about 10 percent 
over these 15 years, without foreign savings the grot-rth rate might have been 
closer to six percent» Howevers more relevant than this calculation is 
the fact that foreign capital inflows '«ere used efficiently, as is partly 
reflected in the very low gross capital-output ratio achieved in Korea 
relative to other developing countries» The foreign capital inflow iasy have 
been atypically large, but what is important is that it was used effectively» 
More to the point is the very strong government which has enabled 
the imposition of far-reaching economic policies including frequent devaluations 
of the currency and tax measures which maintained government saviags at high 
levels until the aftermath, of the rise in energy prices» la turn., government 
policies toward labor have been such that real wages did not rise except in 
response to labor shortages in the late 1960s and again more recently» 
Organized labor is not a powerful political interest group in Korea as it is 
in many other developing econoiTii.es» 
Equally important are the initial conditions8« at the start of Korea's 
rapid industrialization. With respect to the determinants of income distribution 
Japanese colonial occupation resulted in the virtual destruction of the landed 
aristocracy which had ruled Korea prior to the Japanese talc-over» A complete 
and equalizing land reform was initiated by the United States occupation . 
government after World War II and completed by the Korean government in 1952«. 
Thisj along with the economic dislocation caused by two wars and the departure 
of the Japanese, produced a relatively egalitarian distribution of assets 
throughout the society; in short, ever;/one started out after the Korean 
War equally poor or nearly so» Additionally, Korea inherited frora its 
Confucian past a culture in which a very high value is placed on education. 
Through parents' efforts, and despite the fact that public expenditures on 
education in Korea have been low by international standards, it has one of 
the highest literacy rates in the world and a very high proportion of 
secondary school and university graduates« The large investment in human 
capital has resulted in a highly skilled labor force obtained without a large 
expenditure of public resources» 
Lastly, much of the growth of industry and exports may be- inter-
preted as a Return to "normalcy" after the removal of foreign domination 
and the disruption of war. But this, like the other special factors mentioned' 
here, is not sufficient alone to explain the successful performance of the 
Korean economy. Economic policies have made a substantial contribution in 
fostering what appears to be an efficient allocation of resources. Certainly 
none of the available evidence, most of which has been reviewed in the 
proceeding sections, is inconsistent with the propositions either that policy 
has made a difference or that overall resource allocation has been efficient, 
though with some notable exceptions in particular sub-sectors. In short, 
given Korea's poor natural resource endowment and assuming that its comparative 
advantage lie in labor intensive activities, Korea provides an almost classic 
case of an economy following its comparative advantage and reaping the gains 
predicted by conventional economic theory. 
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With respect to the promotion of exports, the most important 
conclusions from Korea's experience appear to be that exports respond to 
incentives while efficiency in resource allocation can be assured by 
operating close to a free trade regime„ Both of these conclusions require 
further scrutiny. Nothing has so far been said about "institutional" 
incentives to exports while much deserves to be said. This concluding 
section will end with a brief discussion of the balance betwen price and 
institutional incentives. In turn, the evidence presented above regarding 
the efficiency of Korean resource allocation is only presumptive, not 
conclusive. And, the Korean, government has relied upon infant industry 
protection as well as subsidies to foster the selective development'of 
import substituting industries. 
One additional feature of Korean export incentive polipy that has 
so far been neglected deserves mention before going on to consider institu-
tional incentives, for it is particularly instructive in the design of 
policies elesewhere» Excepting direct tax preferences, the key element in 
Korea's export promotion policy since the early 1960s has been to permit 
exporters to operate at world market prices, not only for inputs but also 
for capital goods and, through permitting easy access to foreign credits, 
short and longer term finance,, Unrestricted access to and tariff exemptions 
on imported,inputs lead to a bias in favor of using imported inputs unless 
somehow offset. The device of the "domestic L/C/11 which gives the full range 
of export incentives to producers of intermediate goods supplied to exporters, 
has been used to negate this bias in Korea» Thus the export incentive system 
has not'unduly favored the use of'imported over domestically produced inter-
mediate .inputs (of the same quality) in the production of exports, except 
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insofar as the wastage allowance has operated in this direction,, Backward 
linkages from exports to the production of their intermediate goods have 
1/ 
as a result been exploited rather effectively,— However, tariff exemptions 
and low interest rate loans tied to the purchase of imported capital goods 
discrimated against the use of indigenously produced capital goods,^ In 
particular, the difference between the high interest rate on domestic 
commercial credit and the interest rate charged on suppliers' credits to 
purchase imported capital goods has been estimated to have increased the 
total purchase cost (i„e„, including interest payments) of indigenous capital 
3/ - -goods by roughly 20 percent „"* Recently, having recognized the retarding 
effects of these policies on the domestic capital goods sector, the govern-
ment has abolished automatic tariff exemptions for exporters on their 
capital goods imports and has established a relatively large fund for 
providing medium term domestic credit at an interest rata near the-world 
market level. 
We lastly turn to institutional incentives. The most difficult of 
these to appraise are the government assisted export marketing efforts0 The 
government-subsidized Korea Trade Promotion Corporation was founded in 196U 
1/ It is nonetheless true that the import content of Korea's exports is high, 
more than 50 percent. But in the main this stems from exports of products 
requring raw material inputs not found in Korea's natural resource endow-
• ment, though there remain backward linkages to be exploited from the more 
recently established export lines, 
2/ This is thoroughly documented for textile weaving machinery in Rhee and 
Westphal (1976). 
3/ See Frank, Kim, and Westphal (1976), pp. 117 - 119, 
to promote Korea's exports and do market research* It has since established 
offices in a number of important trading centers abroad. The government 
also authorized the Korean Traders' Association (a private organization of 
essporters) to collect one percent of the value of total c„i»f. imports as 
©a export promotion fund. And, it requires its embassies abroad ^parti-
cipate actively in export promotion and has sent special trade missions to 
a number of foreign countries as well. How to market exports effectively 
i@ an important question, which makes the absence of any serious research 
on the part played by the Korean government's marketing assistance parti-
cularly unfortunate„ 
The government established annual export targets broken down in 
considerable detail by commodity* market, and domestic exporter starting 
to 1962» Export incentives end target levels were simultaneously set-by the 
A . 
government acting in concert with exporters' associations in each industry. 
Ebsport targets have generally be en met or exceeded, for the export promotion 
campaign had had high prioritŷ  as nay be seen in the following. Adjoining 
the Minister of Commerce and Industry's office is an '̂ export situation" 
room laid out so that potential target shortfalls may be found at a glance. 
A large staff maintains almost daily contact with the major exporters and it 
is not uncommon for the Minister to intercede in the event of possible 
difficvilti.es in meeting targets. The emphasis on.export promotion was given 
further expression in 1969 when exporters began to be graded into four 
classes on the basis of export performance, with the highest export achievement 
bringing the national medal of honor, public Presidential commendation, and a 
number of more material benefits including relaxation of tax surveillance. 
» 63 -
It would be naive to concludo from this that targets independently-
set by the government determined actual export levels via a command-type 
system, for the targets were not independently set and they were often 
exceeded. Rather the targets complemented incentives to exports without 
which rapid export growth would not have been possible. An important function 
filled by the export targeting system and its trappings was to publicize 
the importance attached by the government to exports : export incentives 
were well advertised and access to them was immediate. An atmosphere was 
thus created in which businessmen could be certain that the incentive 
system would reward efforts to export. Businessmen responded by 
taking thè substantial risks- of expanding production and capacity for export. 
Another important function that may have been filled by the 
export targeting' system appears in the difference noted between the 
response of export and wother" sectors to export- incentives. It will 
be recalled that the distinction between these is that imports 
exceed 10 percent of domestic supply in the latter. It was noted in 
Section U that in 1968 the share of exports in the output of the export 
sectors was 36 percent, while it was Ì4O percent for the "other" sectorsQ 
This is somewhat puzzling in view of the additional finding that, on average, the 
effective subsidy rata on exports exceeded that on domestic sales only in 
the former. Furthermore; an examination of individual export 
industries finds a number in which total incentives to domestic sales were 
higher than those to exports,—'' There is strong, independent evidence 
of carteliaation among producers in most if not all of these export and 
1/ See Westphal and Kim (1976), Section 3-5« 
the "other" sectors. In turn, nearly all. of these sectors 
benefitted from above average nominal protection on the domestic 
market. Cartels in these sectors thus appear to have operated in the 
classic mold of discriminating monopoly, covering their fixed costs 
through high prices in the domestic market and selling at slightly 
1/ 
above marginal cost abroad.™ One can only speculate concerning the 
government's possible encouragement of cartels to promote exports and 
use of export targeting in this connection. The fact that export targets 
and export subsidies such as wastage allowances appear to be negotiated 
jointly betv?een government and business in these industries suggests an 
institutional mechanism under v?hich incentives on the domestic market are 
effectively linked to satisfactory export performance» (There is no 
evidence of excess profits in these industries). Whether exports from 
these sectors would have been less in the absence of export targeting is 
unknowable and a matter of considerable debate among knowledgeable 
specialists. In any event, these industries together accounted for no 
more than roughly 20 percent of'Korea's manufactured exports in 1968. 
1/ The most careful documentation of this is to be found in Rhee and 
Westphal (1976)„ 
ANHEX TABLE 1 
Direct Contribution to 
Agriculture » Forestry & Fishing 
Mining & Energy 
Total Primary 
Processed Food 
Beverages & Tobacco. 
Construction Materials .. / 
Intermediate Products 1 1/ 
Intermediate Products II~ 





Domestic Shares in Total Commodity 
Demand Out: 3Ut arts imports Export Import 
I960 1968 I9S0 1908 ig5o '"¿mi i960 1968 Expansion Substitut 
k3«l$ 31.32 U6,8% 32.8^ 32.9£ 21.1$ 16 «3,« -7.9? 
JU8 1.8 2/j _ 2.k 25,0 6.2 _1. 0 1.1 It.? • -3-9 
Uu9 33.3 U9.5 35,2 - 58.U 10,7 22. U 17. U 1.2 Z?Tó 
12,0 10,1 12,5 11. h 10 7.7 9.U 3.8 • 7,8 • 1.8 
h 5 , l i 6 , 1 6 eh 2.3 1.1' .0 2,2 
.8 1.9 ,9 2 0 ̂  ,9 l.U •U .il <.6 8.0 
10,2 ili.5 8,9 15.0 . h°9 2U.6 16.1 16.1 17.0 Ili. 8 
Hi,3 IS,8 11.9 13.6 X2 * S Xj 0 2 27.3 2U,3 10.lt 5 , 0 
9,0 7 »h 8,0 10.8 7,3 3U-9 -13.8 2,7 36.2 6.8 
,8 1.7 loi* .1 3,3 2,2 3,7 23,2 -li. U 1.8 5.6 1 . 0 1.7 1.7 1,5 6.li 20.8 8,0 -h9-Q ,6 U.2 ,6 2.li J k i I .3 „8 10 „7 • 2 -hi. 9 IfcTT <56". 7 50,i> SCT Hi 06 89.3 77.6 823 1571 3-2 
CTs 
1/ Intermediate products 1 are those at the lowest level of fabrication, for example yarn rather than cloth 
or steel ingots rather than steel sheet and bars., They are -sometimes referred to in the text as basic inter-
mediate products, 
Soxirce: Wsstphal and Kim (197U), Tables H, J, and K. 
Notes; Based on data at constant world prices. 
Totals may not reconcile due to round-off error. 
The classification of industries used here Is that developed by Balassa and Associates (1971), 
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t̂-'vîïT-Y T" F-, "ET T7 O 
Effective Incentive Rate s by industry Gr •oup in 1968 
„.EfffgcJjiSg. Protecti .on Effective Subsi 
Domestic Total Domestic Total 
s_ _ _ E xports Sales Sales Exports Sales 
Agriculture, Forestry, & 
lBo$% —16 » 1J? Fishing 18*1$ rvo cn^yiQ -9.9% 22,1 
Processed Food -18,2 1 -17.0 -2$.2 • 2.3 -23.0 
Beverages & Tobacco 9*3 "! Q «18.6 »25,8 lh <: 5 ( -2lu2 
Mining & Energy' U.O -1,0 2,9 3,0 U.7 
Construction Materials $ -5*2 ' -113 »16,9 »15 « 9 
Intermediate Products 1 -25 ,<5 31,0 £ 0 »29»? U3.U -21.9 
Intermediate Products II 26,1 «0.2 2h«2 19 c 6 . • i?o5 19 «5 
Non-Durable Consumer Goods =•10 c f -80 3' -20,6 S«ij ~lU*7 
Consumer Durables •51.6 38,2 2oh 31,3 
Machinery khoZ -12.? h.2o9 31,5 5.2 30.9 
Transport Equipment 163.5 -£3.1* 163.9 158 „7 -22.8* 159*1 
Sources Vfestphal and Kim [197U1» Tables 2k and 213, 
«Denotes that value added in exports at prices (inclusive of subsidy elements) 
actually paid and received by producers is negative» . 
- 67 -
BVBT.XCGRAP̂ rf 
Adelman, Irma, editor (1969). Pi-actical Approaches to Development Plannings 
Korea * s Second Five-Year Plan. Baltimore i Johns Hopkins Press. 
Balassa 5 Bela (1971). "Industrial Policies in Taiwan and Korea J? 
Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv, band 105, heft 1, 55-77. 
Balassa, Bela, and Associates • (1971) * The Structure of Protection in Developing-
Countries. Baltimores Johns Hopkins Press (for The World Bankfl 
Bhagwati, Jagdish (1965). "On the Equivalence of Tariffs and Quotas.« In 
Trade, Growth„ and_Balance of Payment: Essays in Honor of Gottfried Habejrler. 
Baldwin, Robert E., et. al., editors. Chicagos Rand llcllally. 
Brown, Gilbert T. (1973). Korean Pricing Policies and Economic Development in 
the i960's. Baltimore s Johns Hopkins Press. 
Chenery, Hollis B. (1969), KThe process of Industrialization.« Cambridge; 
Harvard University Project for Quantitative Research in Economic Development, 
Economic Development Report No. 11*6. 
Chenery, Hollis and 1-Ioises Syr quin, with the assistance of Hazel Elkington (1975). 
Patterns of Development 1950-1970. Londons Oxford University Press (for The 
World Banker*""" "* """ *"* 
Choe, Bourn Jong (1975)» "An. Economic Study of the Hasan Free- Trade. Zone." 
In Hong and Krueger (1975). 
Cole, David C., and Princeton N. Lynan (1971). Korean Develcnment: The 
Interplay of Politics and Bconomics, Cambridge; Harvard University Press. 
Cole, David Co (1975). "Ksriset -Penetration by Asia's Super Exporters„« In 
Hong and Krueger (1975). 
Cole David C., and Larry E. Westphal (1975). "The Contribution of Exports to 
Employment in Korea." In Hong and Krueger (1975). 
Frank, Charles R., Jr., Kwang Suk Kim and Larry E. Westphal (1975). 
Trade Regimes and Economic Develooment; South Korea. New York: National 
Bureau of Economic Research. 
Frank, Charles R.} Jr. (1976)« "Foreign Exchange Regimes and Economic Development: 
The Case of Korea." In Trade Strategies for Economic Developments The Asian 
Experience, Manila: The~As i an Dovelq̂ ient Bank. ~ = 
Hong, Viontack and Anne 0, Krueger, editors (1975). Trade and Development in Korea. 
Seoul; Korea Development Institute. 
Hong, Wontak (1976). Factor Supply and Factor.Intensity of Trade in-Korea, Seouls 
Korea Development Institute. 
Littlet Ian M., Tibor Scitovsky, and Maurice Scott (1970), Industry and Trade 
in Some Developing Couritries; A Comparative Study. London: Oxford University 
Press ̂ for the Organization for Economic Cooperation arid Development), 
Kim, Kwang Suk (1975). "Outward-Looking Industrialisation Strategy? The Case 
of Korea," In Hong and Krueger (197?), 
Kim, Young Chin., and Jene Ii. Kwon (1976). »The Utilization of Capital and the 
Growth of Output in a Developing Economy? Case of South Korean Manufacturing 
Industry, 1962-1971." Dekalb, Illinois.' Department of Economics Northern 
Illinois University. 
Hhee, Yung W„3 and Larry E„ Westphal (1976)« "A Micro, Econometric Investigation 
of the"Impact of Industrial Policy on Technology Choice.« Washington: The World 
Bank (mimeo.)» 
Suh, Sang Chul (1975). RDevelopment of e New Industry through Exports; The 
Electronics Industry in Korea.« In Hong and Krueger (19755. 
Suhj Suk Tai. (1975). "Import Substitution and Economic Development in Korea.'1 
Seoul: Korea Development Institute, Working 'paper Ko„ 7519» 
Westphalj Larry E., and Irma Adelman (1972), "Reflections on the Political 
Economy of Planning; The Case of Korea." In Jo, S» K„, and S. Y.Tark, 
editors. Basic Documents and Selected Papers of Korea's Third Five-Year 
Economic Development Plan(_1972~1}'7SJ, Seoul's Sogang University. """ 
Westphal, Larry E. and Kwang Suk Kim (l97h). "Industrial Policy and Development 
in Korea.'« Forthcoming in Balassa, Bela, editor, Development Strategies in 
Stemi-Industrialized Countries. Washington; The World Bank. 

